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REINVENTING COPYRIGHT AND PATENT
Abraham Bell *
Gideon Parchomovsky **
Intellectual property systems all over the world are modeled on a one-size-fits-
all principle. However important or unimportant, inventions and original
works receive the same scope of protection, for the same period of time, backed
by the same variety of legal remedies. Essentially, all intellectual property is
equal under the law. This equality comes at a heavy price, however. The
equality principle gives all creators access to the same remedies, even when
those remedies create perverse litigation incentives. Moreover, society overpays
for innovation through more monopoly losses than are strictly necessary to
incentivize production.
In this Article, we propose a solution for these problems in the form of a self-
tailored system of intellectual property rights. This self-tailored system would
allow inventors and creators to select the optimal type and scope of protection
for their intellectual property. Working from the bottom up, our self-tailored
system would give each innovator a basic package of intellectual property
rights and enforcement powers and then allow her to add more rights and
legal remedies in exchange for a fee.
Our self-tailored system would reduce wasteful litigation while encouraging
wider dissemination and more extensive use of inventions and expressive
works. In addition, our proposal would lower the social cost of granting mo-
nopoly protection to intellectual goods while maintaining an adequate level of
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economic incentives to create. Accordingly, our self-tailored system would con-
stitute a marked improvement over the extant one-size-fits-all design of intel-
lectual property rights.
Unlike other proposals for reform, which often seek to improve access to ex-
pressive works and inventions through compulsory licenses and other coercive
policies, our model is purely voluntary. It respects authors’ and inventors’ au-
tonomy and uses market mechanisms—specifically, pricing—to recalibrate
our intellectual property system in a way that improves societal well-being.
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Introduction
Intellectual property systems all over the world are modeled on a one-
size-fits-all principle. Under current patent law, for instance, an invention
that meets the patentability criteria is entitled to protection of the law for a
specified period.1 Big inventions or small inventions, valuable inventions or
1. See infra Section I.A.
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worthless inventions—all receive the same scope of protection, and the same
variety of legal remedies, for the same period of time. Essentially, all inven-
tions are equal under the law.
While one size fits all is easy to administer, it generates two kinds of
problems for the patent system. First, the equality principle gives all creators
access to the same remedies, even when those remedies create perverse in-
centives. Scholarly literature has focused on the phenomenon of “patent
trolls”—patent holders who have no interest in marketing or manufacturing
their inventions but simply wait for apparent breaches of the patent in order
to sue.2 While scholars have characterized trolling as a problem of under-
productive patents,3 we view it as a problem of incentives. Patents that are
enforced by trolls could potentially be valuable to society, but the one-size-
fits-all system’s excessive litigation rewards incentivize trolls to hoard their
patents for opportunistic litigation rather than license them for productive
use. Specifically, by providing uniformly large remedies even for very small
inventions, the judicial system allows patent trolls to reap more profit
through infringement suits than through selling their inventions on the
market. This is not intrinsically problematic, but the judicial system is not
cost free. Society subsidizes judges, courtrooms, and enforcement measures
while litigating parties bear only some of the costs themselves.4 In the case of
patent trolls, these societal subsidies encourage parties to conduct their
transactions in the courtroom when the optimal forum is actually private
market transactions. In many other cases, partly because the costs of litiga-
tion are asymmetric and must be paid in part even by prevailing parties, the
threat of these litigation costs can force parties into inefficient transactions.5
At the same time, the market does not always succeed in allocating
rights efficiently. Owners of intellectual property rights and users—that is,
potential consumers of those rights—are not always aware of one another,
leading users to infringe and owners to fail to exploit markets optimally. The
2. E.g., Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability,
120 Yale L.J. 1590, 1650 (2011) (defining a patent troll as “a nonpracticing entity that has
contributed little technology but hopes to use patenting as a source of profit”); Caroline Coker
Coursey, Battling the Patent Troll: Tips for Defending Patent Infringement Claims by Non-Manu-
facturing Patentees, 33 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 237, 237–40 (2009) (defining patent trolls); Mat-
thew Fawcett & Jeremiah Chan, March of the Trolls: Footsteps Getting Louder, 13 Intell. Prop.
L. Bull. 1, 1 (2008) (lamenting a lack of legislation to deter patent trolls).
3. For an excellent discussion, see Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us,
2012 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 1, http://journals.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/stanford-tech-
nology-law-review-stlr/online/feldman-giants-among-us.pdf.
4. Brendan S. Maher, The Civil Judicial Subsidy, 85 Ind. L.J. 1527, 1529–33 (2010) (pro-
posing that subsidizing the justice system provides everyone with “court insurance”).
5. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes
and Their Resolution, 27 J. Econ. Literature 1067, 1076 (1989) (“[A]ny policy that increases
litigation costs . . . will increase settlements.”); cf. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale
L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (discouraging settlements because “[c]onsent is often coerced; the bar-
gain may be struck by someone without authority; the absence of a trial and judgment renders
subsequent judicial involvement troublesome; and . . . justice may not be done”).
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one-size-fits-all system greatly exacerbates these problems. For some cre-
ations, the uniform statutory remedies are too generous. These uniform
remedies therefore encourage inefficient use of the legal system in instances
where voluntary bargaining would have been superior; in other cases, the
remedies deter nonconsensual use that would be optimal.
Second, the one-size-fits-all system exacerbates the monopoly problem
created by patents. Patent law grants legal protection in order to incentivize
creation.6 Whatever the patent, the law offers a monopoly consisting of a
specified set of rights over the invention for a fixed period of time. The
monopoly gives the inventor the opportunity to profit handsomely, but it
also subjects society to all the costs of monopoly pricing. As documented in
the economic literature, these costs include excessively high prices and artifi-
cially low production.7 Rewarding inventors with monopoly rights thus nec-
essarily comes at a price. Society receives desirable innovation. But society
also pays the price of monopolistic inefficiencies. Because the same monop-
olistic protection is accorded to all inventions irrespective of their value, so-
ciety often pays too high a price for innovation. Many inventors would have
produced their innovative products and processes even if the reward were
lower. The one-size-fits-all regime thus means that sometimes society over-
pays for innovation by absorbing more monopoly losses than are strictly
necessary to incentivize production.
In this Article, we propose an alternative design for our patent system.
Specifically, we argue that society would be better served by abolishing the
extant one-size-fits-all approach to patent protection and adopting in its
stead a self-tailored system. In our vision, inventors would be offered a
menu of options with varying degrees of protection terms, scopes, and rem-
edies. They would then be allowed to tailor the protection to best fit their
needs. Importantly, the various options would be subject to differential pric-
ing to reflect the cost society stands to incur from the choice of the inventor.
An example can provide a helpful illustration of how our alternative
regime would work. Basics Inc. is a medical-device company that produces
simple applications whose expected commercial life is four years. Basics Inc.
has no use for a patent-protection term of twenty years. Moreover, Basics
Inc. has very little marketing capacity and would have a much easier time if
potential users were able to search out Basics Inc., rather than Basics Inc.
expending efforts to identify potential users. Under our proposed regime,
Basics Inc. would be allowed to purchase a protection term of four years.
Furthermore, Basics Inc. would have the option voluntarily to give up the
6. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Inven-
tion, in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity 609, 609 (Princeton Univ. Press
1962). The same rationale also applies to copyright protection. See, e.g., Robert M. Hurt &
Robert M. Schuchman, The Economic Rationale of Copyright, 56 Am. Econ. Rev. 421, 425
(1966) (“The general welfare will . . . be enhanced by enacting copyright legislation which
encourages the creation and publication of manuscripts that otherwise would not have come
into existence.”).
7. See infra Section I.A.1.
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possibility of injunctive relief and instead to confine itself to monetary dam-
ages if its patent were infringed. In exchange, Basics Inc. would pay a rela-
tively low price for the protection it would receive.
Nano Tech Industries, by contrast, is in the business of developing com-
plex medical instruments that require considerable expenditures on R&D
and whose commercial life is much longer. Accordingly, Nano Tech would
likely choose a protection design that closely resembles the current patent
regime. Under our system, its wish would be granted. But at a higher price.
A self-tailored patent system would yield several important advantages.
First, and most importantly, it would cause patentees to take into account
the cost they impose on society through perverse litigation incentives and
monopolization. While society should welcome innovation, we need not pay
an excessive price to get it. Under our proposal, inventors would be en-
trusted with the task of deciding the degree of protection they wish to re-
ceive but would be asked to pay for their preference. Voluntary
relinquishment of protection, either in terms of time or scope, would result
in social net gain by reducing the deadweight loss associated with patent
protection. While this effect may be small per patent, in the aggregate soci-
ety would benefit from the same level of innovation at a lower social cost.
Second, our self-tailored system would enhance societal welfare by in-
creasing beneficial use of existing patents. Excessive protection of patents,
together with inefficient use of the judicial system, increases the costs of
transactions between patent holders and users, decreases efficient noncon-
sensual use of granted patents, and increases the number of inefficient non-
uses resulting from strategic holdups by patent owners and other bargaining
failures.8 Our system would reduce all of these undesirable effects of the
patent system. In particular, our system would reduce artificial incentives for
transferring intellectual property rights through litigation and would in-
crease the number of voluntary licensed uses of creations.
Third, and relatedly, self-tailored protection would benefit future inno-
vators. As several theorists have noted, the patent system involves a temporal
trade-off. The more protection given to existing patents, the higher the cost
of future innovation that relies on or incorporates current inventions.9 To a
large extent, innovation is cumulative. Many inventors must either get li-
censes from existing patent holders or design around existing patents in or-
der to produce their own inventions. Implementing our proposal would help
clear the path for, and lower the cost of, future innovation. We expect our
system to yield patents with more limited scope and with shorter expiration
8. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The An-
ticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Science 698, 698–99 (1998) (discussing the holdup
problem); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope,
90 Colum. L. Rev. 839, 865–68 (1990) (same).
9. E.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75
Tex. L. Rev. 989, 990 (1997) (pointing out that too much intellectual property protection
deters subsequent innovation, as it “freeze[s] development at the first generation of prod-
ucts”); Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, The Benefits and Costs of Strong Patent Protec-
tion: A Contribution to the Current Debate, 27 Res. Pol’y 273, 281 (1998).
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dates. Consequently, follow-on innovators would incur lower costs in pro-
ducing their inventions.
Finally, our system would reduce the judicial costs associated with adju-
dicating patent conflicts. The expected reduction in the total number and
scope of patent rights would lower the number of infringement suits and
correspondingly limit the amount of resources society must allocate to this
end.
Our self-tailored approach does not end with patent law. We also
demonstrate that our self-tailored system of protection should be extended
to copyrights. Copyright protection is even more multidimensional than
patent protection. In the case of copyrights, creators could choose from a
menu of varying protection terms and substantive rights. For example, an
author could waive her rights to exclusivity in copying and creating deriva-
tive works in appropriate cases. Conversely, she might settle for the right to
demand attribution of authorship. Along the same dimension, she could
cede her right to enforce against noncommercial users or against users who
created a single copy of the work but stopped short of distributing it. All of
these choices, of course, would be built into the pricing system. More copy-
right rights would be more expensive to obtain; fewer rights would be
cheaper.
Other scholars have previously discussed uniformity’s potential draw-
backs, and we compare our proposal to two alternative approaches that may
be found in the literature. The first is Professor Burk and Professor Lemley’s
call to enhance judicial development of patent law through technology-spe-
cific interpretation of various microdoctrines.10 We show that our system
would result in more efficiency-enhancing outcomes than Burk and Lem-
ley’s system. Our system is based on ex ante determinations of the value of
individual inventions. This self-tailored system necessarily outperforms any
broad doctrinal reform, even if the reforms are limited to particular technol-
ogies or industries. In addition, our proposal is not susceptible to the kinds
of legal uncertainty and gaming that might affect Burk and Lemley’s system.
A second alternative approach is that proposed by Professor Carroll.11
While expressing reservations about the one-size-fits-all design of the cur-
rent intellectual property system, Carroll ultimately endorses it as a “second-
best solution.”12 He posits that it is desirable to reduce uniformity costs, but
he stops short of advancing a single, coherent approach to the challenge of
10. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, The Patent Crisis and How the Courts Can
Solve It (2009) [hereinafter Burk & Lemley, Patent Crisis]; Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lem-
ley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1575 (2003) [hereinafter Burk & Lemley, Policy
Levers]; Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. 1155 (2002) [hereinafter Burk & Lemley, Technology-Specific].
11. Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual Prop-
erty Law, 55 Am. U. L. Rev. 845 (2006); see also Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit All:
A Framework for Tailoring Intellectual Property Rights, 70 Ohio St. L.J. 1361 (2009) [hereinaf-
ter Carroll, One Size]; Michael W. Carroll, Patent Injunctions and the Problem of Uniformity
Cost, 13 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 421 (2007).
12. Carroll, One Size, supra note 11, at 1391.
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uniformity. Instead, he argues that, in many cases, adopting “flexible stan-
dards”—and, more generally, flexible thinking to “render formally defined
uniform rights more pliable in application”—is the best that can be done.13
In other cases, Carroll embraces tailoring rights along industry- or technol-
ogy-specific lines.14 Yet he openly admits that these suggestions “are not a
complete answer to the problem.”15 He also confesses that his framework is
problematic from a practical standpoint. Hence, Carroll does not provide a
comprehensive solution to the uniformity problem. Instead, he provides a
list of factors to be considered by policymakers in evaluating possible ap-
proaches to the problem as well as some preliminary reflections as to possi-
ble directions they can weigh.16 We show that our solution of self-tailoring
largely avoids Carroll’s concerns. Furthermore, we demonstrate that our
proposal can be implemented in practice and that it would lead to more
nuanced and precise tailoring than Carroll’s admittedly inchoate framework.
This Article presents our argument in four parts. In Part I, we examine
the motivations and mechanics of the extant intellectual property system,
demonstrating the problems created by the one-size-fits-all approach. Part II
presents our alternative proposal, showing how self-tailored rights can be
easily implemented in patent and copyright. Part III examines the incentive
effects and other benefits of our proposed self-tailored approach. In this
Part, we demonstrate the proposal’s likely effect of developing markets for
intellectual property rights and reducing strategic but inefficient use of the
judicial system. Finally, in Part IV, we respond to four potential objections
to our proposal and elucidate why it is superior to such alternatives as tech-
nology-specific protection and contract-based modification of rights.
I. The One-Size-Fits-All Design of the Intellectual Property
System
In this Part, we examine the uniform structure of the extant intellectual
property system and explore the social costs of that uniformity. In particu-
lar, we show that uniformity raises the anticompetitive effects of intellectual
property law—thereby raising prices and reducing output—while also in-
creasing the costs of resolving disputes among intellectual property owners
and potential users. We end the Part by examining several possible justifica-
tions for uniformity.
A. Uniformity and Its Costs
Despite their many differences, the patent and copyright subfields of
intellectual property law share a common characteristic: their protection
13. Id. at 1366.
14. Id. at 1400.
15. Id. at 1366.
16. Id. at 1406–24.
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schemes are predicated on the one-size-fits-all principle. All patentable in-
ventions enjoy the same scope of protection for a uniform period of time.17
Expressive works confer upon their authors a uniform bundle of rights for a
uniform statutory duration.18
Congress’s current approach allocates intellectual property protection
by granting equal potential protection to creations that meet certain thresh-
old requirements. In patent law, these requirements are novelty, usefulness,
and non-obviousness.19 Copyright law screens through the requirements of
originality, fixation, and classifications of works as “works of authorship.”20
Once the threshold conditions are met, each body of law bestows an
identical exclusive set of rights upon the owner of the intellectual asset. Pat-
ent law confers upon inventors the rights to exclusivity in using, selling,
offering for sale, and importing the patented invention.21 Copyright law be-
stows upon authors exclusivity in the rights to reproduce, adapt, distribute,
publicly (or digitally) perform, and publicly display the work.22
This one-size-fits-all approach comes at a real cost to society. Specifi-
cally, it forces society to pay an excessive price for the production of intellec-
tual assets.
17. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012) (“Every patent shall contain . . . a grant to the
patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for
sale, or selling the invention . . . and, if the invention is a process, of the right to exclude others
from using, offering for sale or selling throughout the United States . . . .”); id. § 154(a)(2)
(“[S]uch grant shall be for a term beginning on the date on which the patent issues and ending
20 years from the date on which the application for the patent was filed . . . .”). As we discuss
in more detail below, however, many scholars contend that this uniformity imposes serious
costs on society. See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme
Court: A Quiet Revolution, 11 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 1, 5–6 (2004) (detailing the costs of uni-
form protection and calling for narrow tailoring of protection under appropriate
circumstances).
18. The Copyright Act grants the rights to reproduce the copyrighted work, prepare de-
rivative works, distribute copies, and perform and display the work in public. 17 U.S.C.
§ 106(1)–(5) (2012); see also id. § 302(a) (“Copyright in a work created on or after January 1,
1978 subsists from its creation and . . . endures for a term consisting of the life of the author
and 70 years after the author’s death.”). The Copyright Act does dictate some minor variations
in rights, depending on the type of work. For instance, certain works of visual art are entitled
to an additional set of “moral rights” concerning the work’s integrity and attribution of au-
thorship. Id. § 106A. Other countries eschew many of the minor variations; in European copy-
right systems, for instance, all works receive moral rights protection. See Thomas F. Cotter,
Pragmatism, Economics, and the Droit Moral, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 1, 6–27 (1997) (summarizing the
history of the droit moral in Europe and the United States).
19. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103.
20. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of au-
thorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . .”); Jane C. Ginsburg, The Concept of
Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law, 52 DePaul L. Rev. 1063 (2003).
21. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1).
22. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
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1. Anticompetitive Effects
It is well established in the economic and legal literature that the exclu-
sivity of rights created by intellectual property protection leads to monopo-
listic pricing of intellectual goods.23 The very essence of intellectual property
rights is to insulate their holders from competition by prohibiting direct
copying (and other utilization) for a certain period of time. The justification
for such monopoly protection is straightforward: intellectual works are pub-
lic goods that cannot be efficiently produced or sold in a market without
legal protection.24 If inventions were unprotected by the law, very few users
of the invention would ever pay the inventor. Instead, they would imitate the
invention or cut a deal with an imitator. In the long run, the market price
for rights in the invention would tend toward zero.25 With no realistic
chance of profits from an invention, potential creators would not invent new
products. Legal monopoly protection is supposed to overcome this problem
by giving creators a chance to earn a profit on their inventions during the
period of the monopoly. Monopoly protection for the intellectual property
rights is supposed to give inventors and authors the opportunity to recoup
the fixed cost of inventorship and authorship—namely, the initial cost of
producing the goods.26
Yet the monopoly benefit bestowed upon inventors and authors distorts
the price of creations and skews the allocation of resources in society. Inven-
tors and authors sell rights to their inventions and works at prices reflecting
a monopolistic rather than a competitive market. Economic theory tells us
that monopolistic prices are higher than competitive prices, while the good
is scarcer in a monopolistic market than it would be in the competitive
market.27
In addition, the earnings of the inventor or author during the monopoly
period bear no relationship to the costs of production. A cheaply produced
invention may yield enormous profits for the inventor during the period of
monopoly protection. An expensively produced work of authorship may
yield relatively meager profits. Although one’s intuition might suggest other-
wise, the former phenomenon is extremely problematic, while the latter
23. Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 761,
772 (2002) (“[P]atent laws reward [invention] by promising the inventor the right to exploit
the invention by excluding competitors or charging prices higher than its postinvention
costs.”); Rick Harbaugh & Rahul Khemka, Does Copyright Enforcement Encourage Piracy?, 58 J.
Indus. Econ. 306, 309–14 (2010) (examining the relationship between prices of copyrighted
works and piracy).
24. Carrier, supra note 23, at 767.
25. See 1 Herbert Hovenkamp et al., IP and Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust
Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law § 1.1, at 1–4 (2d ed. 2010) (“If we
assume that it is nearly costless to distribute information to others . . . it will prove virtually
impossible to charge for information over the intermediate run . . . .”).
26. Suzanne Scotchmer, Innovation and Incentives 36 (2004).
27. William A. McEachern, Economics: A Contemporary Introduction 204–05
(10th ed. 2014). For a useful overview of some of the literature on monopolies, see Donald C.
Wellington and Joseph C. Gallo, The Social Costs of Monopoly?, 9 Rev. Indus. Org. 221 (1994).
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need not concern us. Where an enormous investment is likely to yield only
small earnings, the potential inventor will probably never create the inven-
tion: it makes no sense to invest more in the creative process than can be
earned from the creation.
It is highly problematic, however, when a small investment brings a
windfall profit. The state could have offered far less monopoly protection
and still have induced the same inventiveness. If monopoly were costless,
then the windfall for inventors would be unobjectionable. But monopoly
comes at the cost of high market prices and underproduction. Overpaying
for the invention imposes a serious cost on society.
Patents provide a clear illustration of the problem. Consider an agricul-
tural company that patents a genetically enhanced wheat seed that is far
more resistant to disease than a natural seed. By dint of the patent protec-
tion it secured, the company will enjoy a period of exclusivity of close to
twenty years. In that period, the company will set a profit-maximizing price
for the genetically modified seed that is higher than the competitive price.
Monopolistic pricing generates two effects. The first effect is distribu-
tive. It transfers resources from consumers to the monopolist.28 In our ex-
ample, farmers who wish to take advantage of the superior seed would have
to pay a supracompetitive price to obtain it. If the monopolistic price of a
bag of seeds is $100, instead of a competitive price of $80, the monopolist
becomes richer than she would be in a competitive market and the farmer
becomes poorer.
The second effect concerns allocative efficiency. Monopolistic pricing
invariably generates a deadweight loss.29 This loss arises from the fact that
certain farmers value the product at more than the competitive price but less
than the monopolistic price. For instance, there are farmers who can extract
$90 of utility from a bag of seeds. They would gladly have purchased the
goods for the competitive price of $80 but will not pay the monopolistic
price of $100. When these farmers forgo the use of the superior seeds, they
eliminate $10 of utility per bag that would have existed in the competitive
market. Likewise, they eliminate the potential profit the seller would have
earned on the sale in the competitive market. More generally, the forgone
transactions impose a loss on both consumers and producers represented by
the combined surplus the parties would have received in a competitive
market.30
The monopolistic losses of patented goods like farm seed are similar to
the monopolistic losses created by copyright protection. Copyright protec-
tion confers upon authors a bundle of exclusive rights in order to motivate
28. See McEachern, supra note 27, at 205 (“[T]he monopolist’s economic profit comes
entirely from what was consumer surplus under perfect competition.”); Richard A. Posner,
The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. Pol. Econ. 807 (1975).
29. McEachern, supra note 27, at 205.
30. Massimo Motta, Competition Policy 41–42 (2004).
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them to produce original expressive content.31 The monopolistic distortions
in the case of copyright protection may be more limited and more attenu-
ated than in the case of patent law, but they are no less real.
Most copyrighted works have close substitutes, which serves as a check
on the ability of copyright holders to secure monopolistic rents. For exam-
ple, if the publisher of a book were to charge an excessively high price, read-
ers might choose to buy different books. Indeed, Professor Yoo32 and
Professor Abramowicz33 independently argue that the market for copy-
righted works is best captured by the model of monopolistic competition—a
market structure in which each product is unique but has close substitutes,
with the problem being too little or too much variety among the products.
Even so, scholars overwhelmingly agree that copyright protection distorts
efficiency.34
It is noteworthy that Professor Ayres and Professor Klemperer have
demonstrated that each additional year of exclusivity comes at an increasing
cost to society.35 The intuition behind this result is straightforward. Each
year of future protection creates a progressively smaller marginal increase in
incentives to produce. Thus, the incentives to produce created by protection
in years one through five are enormously greater than the incentives created
by years seventy through seventy-five.
The reason for this is a phenomenon known in economics as the time
value of goods or money. This phenomenon is the economic version of the
platitude “a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.” Money or an asset in
hand is far more valuable than money or an asset that will be obtained only
in the future because present possession allows present enjoyment of util-
ity.36 The farther into the future one postpones possession, the more utility
one loses over time. The net present value of $1,000 to be obtained 120 years
from now (the equivalent of the copyright-protection term) is only $2.87.37
31. See, e.g., Sara K. Stadler, Incentive and Expectation in Copyright, 58 Hastings L.J.
433, 433–34 (2006) (describing the established field of thought for the incentives provided by
copyrights).
32. Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 212, 241
(2004).
33. Michael Abramowicz, An Industrial Organization Approach to Copyright Law, 46 Wm.
& Mary L. Rev. 33, 35–39 (2004).
34. See, e.g., Giovanni B. Ramello, Copyright and Antitrust Issues, in The Economics of
Copyright 118, 124 (Wendy J. Gordon & Richard Watt eds., 2003); Shyamkrishna Balganesh,
Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1569, 1578 (2009); Niva Elkin-Ko-
ren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of Contract, 12 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 93, 99
(1997).
35. Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without Reducing In-
novation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97
Mich. L. Rev. 985, 992 (1999).
36. See Timothy J. Gallagher & Joseph D. Andrew, Financial Management: Prin-
ciples and Practice 196 (4th ed. 2007) (explaining why money has time value).
37. The calculation assumes an interest of 5%. Naturally, a higher interest rate would
further decrease the amount, whereas a lower interest rate would increase it.
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Extending the term of protection for intellectual property thus produces de-
creasing benefits the longer the term is extended. The deadweight loss, by
contrast, remains significant over time. Adding up the two effects, Ayres and
Klemperer write that “[t]he last bit of monopoly pricing produces large
amounts of deadweight loss for a relatively small amount of patentee
profit.”38 Furthermore, they admonish legal scholars for “fail[ing] to appre-
ciate that unconstrained monopoly pricing is not a cost-justified means of
rewarding patentees.”39
Just as importantly, copyright protection also stunts the development of
new technologies. The copyright system’s doctrines of “secondary liability”
allow copyright owners to sue technology and internet companies for bring-
ing new technologies to market where the technologies potentially facilitate
and abet copyright infringement.40 As the Supreme Court acknowledged in
MGM v. Grokster, Ltd., “[t]he more artistic protection is favored, the more
technological innovation may be discouraged; the administration of copy-
right law is an exercise in managing the tradeoff.”41 It is critical to under-
stand that, because technology providers can never know in advance whose
rights their technology might infringe, they must secure permission from all
copyright owners. Hence, they face the proverbial holdup problem,42 where
each copyright owner has veto power over the distribution of the new
technology.
It is therefore acknowledged that patent and copyright protection pro-
vide a second-best solution. They incentivize production of intellectual as-
sets at the cost of restricting public access to those assets and creating other
societal losses. This trade-off is well known to economists, legal theorists,
and students.43
Compare the losses created by monopoly protection in patent and copy-
right with those created by such protection in trademark. Trademark law is
38. Ayres & Klemperer, supra note 35, at 987.
39. Id.
40. 3 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright
§ 12.04[A][3][b] (2013).
41. 545 U.S. 913, 928 (2005) (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984)).
42. See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and
Standard Setting, in 1 Innovation Policy and the Economy 119, 125–26 (Adam B. Jaffe et
al. eds., 2001); James Bessen, Holdup and Licensing of Cumulative Innovations with Private
Information, 82 Econ. Letters 321 (2004); James Bessen & Eric Maskin, Sequential Innova-
tion, Patents, and Imitation, 40 RAND J. Econ. 611 (2009); Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 8;
Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 9, at 275–76; Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in
the Biopharmaceutical Industry: The Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 813,
838–44 (2001); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the
Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 77, 127–28 (1999).
43. E.g., Balganesh, supra note 34; Qianwei Fu, Note, Eldred v. Ashcroft: Failure in Bal-
ancing Incentives and Access, 38 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1755, 1758 (2005); see also Ian E. Novos &
Michael Waldman, The Effects of Increased Copyright Protection: An Analytic Approach, 92 J.
Pol. Econ. 236, 237 (1984).
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not traditionally justified by reference to the incentive theory.44 Rather, the
conventional economic justification for trademark protection is grounded in
information costs.45 Trademarks economize on consumers’ information
costs by providing consumers with a low-cost means for identifying the
source of goods and services.46 This, in turn, provides businesses with an
incentive to ensure the high quality of goods and services in order to create
and lock in a loyal consumer base.47 The contrast with copyright and patent
protection is striking. Because investments in trademark pay off directly by
lowering information costs for each consumer, the benefits to producers de-
rive from advantages in the competitive market rather than from the crea-
tion of monopolies. Gone are the deadweight losses that accompany the
exclusivity of copyright and patent rights. Whereas one-size-fits-all protec-
tion for trademark ensures legal protection that matches the societal benefit
of the protected information, one-size-fits-all protection in copyright and
patent virtually guarantees unnecessary societal losses for many legal
protections.
2. Dispute-Resolution Costs
The second societal cost imposed by intellectual property protection de-
rives from the enforcement of rights. The dilemma of how to enforce legal
rights is familiar from other areas of the law. Thanks to Professor Calabresi
and Douglas Melamed,48 a vast scholarly literature addresses the question of
when the law should support legal entitlements with injunctive relief
(roughly equivalent to “property-rule protection” in Calabresi and Me-
lamed’s terminology) and when it should offer only compensatory damages
(roughly “liability-rule protection” according to Calabresi and Melamed)
upon breach of the entitlement.49 The literature is highly influenced by
44. See Greg Lastowka, Trademark’s Daemons, 48 Hous. L. Rev. 779, 781–82 (2011)
(noting that consumer protection is the primary justification of trademark law, which distin-
guishes it from copyright and patent law).
45. Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in Trademark
Law, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 547, 556 (2006).
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inaliena-
bility: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972).
49. E.g., Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to
Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 Yale L.J. 1027, 1031–32 (1995) (likening liability-rules protec-
tion of intellectual property to a favorable Solomonic division); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property
Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property,
102 Yale L.J. 1533, 1573–76 (1993) (considering liability-rule protection for intellectual prop-
erty); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85
Minn. L. Rev. 697, 732–36 (2001) (examining the benefits of a property-rules regime for
patent law).
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transaction-cost economics, and it focuses on the possibility of private bar-
gaining around legal entitlements.50 For instance, when high transaction
costs combine with “sticky” entitlements, like injunctions, legal entitlements
may end up being held by owners who do not value those entitlements as
highly as potential transferees.
While all areas of the law confront enforcement questions, enforcement
is particularly problematic in intellectual property due to the law’s provision
of the same expansive list of remedies to all holders of intellectual property
rights. The remedy menu includes preliminary and temporary injunctions,
actual damages, defendant’s profits, statutory damages, and in particular
cases enhanced statutory damages and treble damages.51 Certainly in some
cases, one or more of these remedies is appropriate for enforcing intellectual
property rights. But just as certainly in other cases, the impressive array of
remedial options is too much. The panoply of remedies may deter some
kinds of optimal use of protected intellectual property rights, leaving poten-
tially high-value users of the entitlement without a realistic possibility of
enjoying the benefits of the intellectual property.
In some instances, two other factors may combine with the array of
remedy options to complicate further this enforcement problem and lead
patent and copyright holders to refrain from voluntarily transacting with
potential users of the invention or expressive work. These two factors are the
vagueness of intellectual property rights and the high search costs for users.
Together, the factors enhance the attractiveness of litigation as opposed to
standard licensing. As a result, they may lead owners to rely on infringement
litigation to generate revenue rather than licensing their inventions or ex-
pressive works. Consequently, owners may make more money by foiling use
of intellectual property works than by facilitating use of them.
The vagueness of intellectual property rights imposes a significant de-
gree of uncertainty on third parties. Intellectual property law protects intel-
lectual assets not only against direct infringements—that is, cases involving
exact replications of the intellectual asset. It also protects against indirect
infringements—that is, cases involving close approximations of intellectual
assets.52 The former type of protection may be termed central protection and
the latter peripheral protection. Peripheral protection of intellectual assets
makes it very difficult for third parties to discern the precise boundaries of
intellectual assets. Unlike the readily identifiable boundaries of physical as-
sets, the outer contours of intellectual property assets are elusive and inde-
terminable ex ante. Doctrines such as pattern similarity in copyright law53
50. E.g., Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33
Stan. L. Rev. 387, 392–93 (1981); Lemley, supra note 9, at 1053–55; Henry E. Smith, Property
and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1719 (2004).
51. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114–1117 (2012); 17 U.S.C. §§ 502–505 (2012); 35 U.S.C. §§ 283–285
(2012).
52. Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 719 (2009).
53. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946) (establishing a copying-analysis
framework suggesting that increased access to a prior copyrighted work lowers the required
similarity to find infringement).
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and the doctrine of equivalents in patent law54 expose even the most diligent
of users to the risk of potential legal liability.
Moreover, in many cases, it is unclear whether an intellectual product
constitutes protectable intellectual property at all. Patent law requires regis-
tration of inventions as a prerequisite for legal protection, but registration of
a patent does not actually guarantee that the law protects the invention.55
The validity of intellectual property rights in a new invention may always be
attacked in court.56 This means that it is very difficult for potential users of
an invention to know whether that work enjoys any legal protection.
Roughly half of all registered patents that are attacked in court are found to
be invalid.57 In some ways, the situation is even worse in the case of copy-
right. Copyright law does not require registration of the expression in order
for the work to constitute intellectual property,58 and, in any event, registra-
tion does not guarantee that the claimed property is actually protectable
under law.59 It is often difficult for potential users of expressions to be cer-
tain that there is any intellectual property to infringe.
For users and creators of intellectual products, the vague standards
mean that litigation over rights can be a roll of the dice. Not all users and
creators are equally risk averse. Some creators are happy to take their
chances, imposing high costs of risk on all potential risk-averse users. This
imposition of risk can constitute a substantial cost to society.
High search costs combine with the vagueness of intellectual property
rights to make enforcement even more costly for society. The vagueness it-
self exposes users to high search costs; even where users discover the exis-
tence of a protected right, they cannot easily discern what is protected and
what remains in the public domain. It bears emphasis, however, that the
problem of search costs is distinct from the vagueness problem and that high
search costs stem from several sources.
The problem is most acute in the context of copyright law, where pro-
tection is not conditioned on registration and where most works are not
organized in a searchable database or a central repository. Additionally, the
54. Under the doctrine of equivalents, courts may find liability if the allegedly infringing
device “performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the
same result.” Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950)
(quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
55. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2)–(3) (allowing defendants in patent-infringement suits
to assert invalidity of the patent as a defense).
56. Id.
57. Carl Shapiro, Patent System Reform: Economic Analysis and Critique, 19 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. 1017, 1028 (2004).
58. See Robert D. Hadl, Notice, Deposit and Registration, 25 Bull. Copyright Soc’y
U.S.A. 218, 220 (1978) (“Registration, like deposit, is not a condition of copyright
protection.”).
59. See generally Margreth Barrett, Reconciling Fair Use and Trademark Use, 28 Cardozo
Arts & Ent. L.J. 1 (2010) (exploring the relationship among trademark use, registration,
protection, and fair use).
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tools available for searching copyrighted works are relatively limited.60 While
one can search for combinations of words and even for musical composi-
tions and recordings, a potential user will find it very difficult to design
effective search algorithms for color combinations, compositions of dance
steps, or the design of useful articles. The search tools are even less effective
if copyright protection inheres in the selection and arrangement of the con-
stitutive expressive elements of the work.61 Compounding the problem is the
fact that legal copyright rights can be nested, meaning that a single expres-
sion may turn out to be subject to several different intellectual property
rights owned by several different parties, all of which must be collected in
order to use the work.62 For instance, a user’s ability to broadcast a film may
be subject not only to the rights of the owner of the copyright in the film
but also to the rights of the owner of the novel on which the screenplay for
the film was based.
The search costs are somewhat lower in the domain of patents. Patent
protection arises from registration.63 Consequently, we have a searchable re-
pository of all patent applications. Furthermore, the search tools in this case
are quite effective, and they continue to improve.64 Nevertheless, the search
costs in the area of patent law are far from negligible. One reason for these
costs is the sheer number of patents. Any patent anywhere in the world
ought to be searched if one wishes to avoid patent infringement. Further-
more, it is necessary to search all preexisting literature. Additionally, patent
applications are notoriously vague and difficult to parse,65 and the language
of claims is generally indefinite. Claims also incorporate various terms of art
and cross references, which render the claims virtually incomprehensible to
60. See generally U.S. Copyright Office, Circular No. 22, How to Investigate the
Copyright Status of a Work (2012).
61. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (holding that the
selection and arrangement of works consisting of otherwise unoriginal elements may still be
protected).
62. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 61 (1976) (“These exclusive rights, which comprise the so-
called ‘bundle of rights’ that is a copyright, are cumulative and may overlap in some cases.”);
see also 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2012) (recognizing the various types of copyright ownership and the
possibility of joint and collective ownership).
63. The patent itself does not exist until it is vested to the inventor by the government.
See 35 U.S.C. § 153 (2012) (“Patents shall be issued in the name of the United States of
America . . . .”). Protection arises only after the issuance of this patent. See id. § 154 (“Every
patent shall contain . . . a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude
others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention . . . .”).
64. See generally Patent Searching (David Hunt et al. eds., 2007); Dennis Crouch,
Google’s Improved Patent Search, Patently-O (Aug. 14, 2012), http://www.patentlyo.com/pat-
ent/2012/08/googles-improved-patent-search.html.
65. See Edward D. Manzo, How to Improve Patent Claim Interpretations, 22 Fed. Cir. B.J.
203, 203 (“[D]espite the crucial role that claim construction plays in patent litigation, our
rules are still ill-defined and inconsistently applied, even by us[, the Federal Circuit].” (quoting
Retractable Techs. Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson, & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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untrained readers. Surely, these obstacles can be overcome, but at a high
cost.
As a result of the combined impact of an impressive array of remedial
options, vagueness of rights, and high search costs for users, patent and cop-
yright holders often find it more profitable to generate revenue through liti-
gation than by commercializing their inventions and expressive works. This
explains, in part, the emergence of so-called patent and copyright trolls—or,
in less colorful terms, “non-practicing entities”—that amass portfolios of
intellectual property rights without ever intending to turn them into fully
developed products subject to market transactions. The sheer volume of in-
tellectual property remedies, the vague content and scope of the rights, and
the attendant high search costs make conflicts over intellectual property
rights more likely to occur than disputes over other legal rights. The upshot
is that holders of intellectual property rights rely on the court system at a
disproportionate rate.
It is important to emphasize that part of the cost falls on the rest of
society. The private cost of litigation does not equal the social cost.66 The
public purse partially subsidizes the operation of the legal system. This social
subsidy gives private litigants an incentive to utilize the legal system. Thus,
inefficient enforcement is costly to society both directly and indirectly. Uni-
form rules contribute significantly to the inefficiency of intellectual property
enforcement.
B. Arguments in Favor of Uniformity
Given the obvious costs of uniformity, why has the one-size-fits-all ap-
proach persisted for so long? A careful perusal of the literature reveals three
principal arguments that support a one-size-fits-all intellectual property law:
(1) administrative costs; (2) considerations of political economy; and (3)
information costs. In this Section, we address each of these arguments and
assess the force of each. We conclude that none of these justifications in its
own right presents a compelling case against differential protection. Nor do
all of them combined.
1. Administrative Costs
The first and most intuitive argument in favor of a uniform system of
intellectual property protection is the relatively low cost of administering
this model. Carroll argues that variation in available legal rights creates two
types of costs that can be called “administrative.”67
One type of administrative cost arises primarily at the stage when rights
are transferred. Licensing and transfer agreements concerning intellectual
66. Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and Social Motive to
Use the Legal System, 26 J. Legal Stud. 575, 581–86 (1997).
67. Carroll, One Size, supra note 11, at 1396.
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property rights must necessarily be more detailed and precise as the varia-
tion in intellectual property rights grows. In the extreme case where intellec-
tual property rights come in only one variety, drafting agreements should be
relatively short and straightforward. As intellectual property owners acquire
greater flexibility in tailoring their rights and transferring them, they must
be more precise in delineating exactly what they wish to transfer. Drafting
and policing agreements specifying many rights would presumably be more
costly. Carroll concludes that this cost may be significant enough to foil the
efficiency gains from tailored rights.68 Stated otherwise, notwithstanding the
inefficiencies of the one-size-fits-all model of intellectual property protec-
tion, its administrative cost savings are significant enough to make the one-
size-fits-all approach preferable to the alternative of variable rights.
The other type of cost associated with administrating variable rights,
according to Carroll, concerns expected efforts by litigants to test the
boundaries of the different variants of legal protection.69 If different kinds of
intellectual property rights benefit from different levels of protection, rights
owners will naturally attempt to game the system by characterizing their
rights as the kind that enjoy greater protection, while potential users will try
to game the system by recharacterizing the same rights as those enjoying less
protection. Courts will have to expend efforts after the fact to determine the
boundaries of the different rights, and legislators will have to do the same ex
ante. Together, these efforts can impose substantial costs on society. A one-
size-fits-all approach reduces these costs by reducing variability.
As we show later, the concerns about administrative costs are significant
and noteworthy, but they do not apply equally to all efforts to tailor rights.70
It is possible, we argue, to relax significantly the one-size-fits-all principle
without incurring large administrative costs. Indeed, we argue that our pro-
posal would likely lower such costs.
2. Considerations of Political Economy
A different argument for uniformity in the intellectual property system
focuses on political-economy concerns. This argument holds that adherence
to a one-size-fits-all design requires a broad consensus as a prerequisite for
changing our intellectual property system. Since any change affects all right
holders, alterations can pass only if they enjoy broad support from all rele-
vant parties.71
This argument does not withstand scrutiny. As a descriptive matter, it is
an empirical claim that lacks supporting data. More abstractly, there are
ample reasons to doubt that an empirical examination would support the
68. Id. at 1399.
69. See id. at 1425.
70. See infra Section IV.A.
71. Carroll, One Size, supra note 11, at 1398 (“With uniform patents or copyrights, legis-
lative change must submit to what Tom Olson calls the ‘iron law of consensus,’ by which all
industries affected by the law must agree for an amendment to pass through the many veto
points in the legislative process.” (footnote omitted)).
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claim. There is a substantial literature demonstrating the gap between collec-
tive preferences and the outcomes of legislative processes.72 The argument
that intellectual property legislation truly reflects societal consensus implic-
itly assumes that the various interest groups that affect intellectual property
policy wield approximately the same political clout. This assumption is not
supported by reality, however. In fact, the world of intellectual property
politics is characterized by very strong groups, such as pharmaceutical com-
panies and big movie studios,73 that operate alongside much weaker groups,
such as documentary filmmakers and small-time musicians. At least anec-
dotally, it is clear that strong interest groups can secure the legislation they
want without help from others.74 It is doubtful that the current shape of
intellectual property law—including the various amendments that are
adopted yearly—reflects wide consensus.75
3. Information Costs
A final justification for the one-size-fits-all system is rooted in informa-
tion costs. The argument is simple. It posits that the mere existence of differ-
ent kinds of rights raises information costs for third parties. This argument
relies heavily on the work of scholars such as Professor Merrill and Professor
Smith.76 In an influential article, Merrill and Smith persuasively argue that
there is an optimal standardization of property and intellectual property
rights, because such rights are in rem rights that apply against the rest of the
world. Consequently, third parties must educate themselves about the scope
and content of such rights. The more variance there is, the greater the infor-
mational burden with which the public must contend. Hence, according to
Merrill and Smith, there ought to be a limit on the menu of property and
intellectual property rights and, moreover, the recognition of new rights
should be reserved to the state; as a matter of sound legal policy, private
72. The most famous illustration of this gap is Arrow’s impossibility theorem, according
to which, under conditions that plausibly apply to most democratic decisionmaking, it is im-
possible to measure collective preference through voting. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Social
Choice and Individual Values (3d ed. 2012). For a helpful review of some of the literature’s
main findings, see Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice III (2003).
73. Eric E. Johnson, Calibrating Patent Lifetimes, 22 Santa Clara Computer & High
Tech. L.J. 269, 290 (2006) (describing the pharmaceutical industry as “one of the most patent-
advantaged industries”); see also Niels Schaumann, Copyright Class War, 11 UCLA Ent. L.
Rev. 247, 270–72 (2004) (explaining that members of the music and movie industries came to
a position of influence in copyright law).
74. See, e.g., Free Expression Policy Project, “The Progress of Science and Use-
ful Arts”: Why Copyright Today Threatens Intellectual Freedom 15 (2003), available
at http://fepproject.org/policyreports/copyright2d.pdf (detailing the extensive lobbying by Dis-
ney to extend the length of copyrights with the Sonny Bono Law).
75. See generally Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 Or.
L. Rev. 275 (1989) (discussing the production of intellectual property legislation).
76. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Prop-
erty: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1 (2000). For similar insights in the context
of intellectual property, see Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 Va. L.
Rev. 465 (2004).
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parties should not have the power to create new property and intellectual
property rights.77
Merrill and Smith’s insight is powerful and important. Yet it is not uni-
versally accepted.78 Without rehashing the scholarly debate, it is sufficient for
our purposes to make two observations. First, while Merrill and Smith pro-
vide a prima facie argument for optimal standardization, they never attempt
to identify where the optimality point lies. Instead, they construct a theoreti-
cal argument proving that it would be socially undesirable to create an end-
less list of property and intellectual property rights and asserting that there
exists an optimal standardization standard. The article does not attempt to
argue that the current enumeration of intellectual property rights is necessa-
rily the optimal one. Rather, the authors remain agnostic on this subject.79
Hence, while the problem of excessive information costs on third parties is
notable, it does not provide an adequate argument in favor of the status quo.
Second, and relatedly, in the domain of intellectual property rights there
is already a great deal of experimentation carried out through private order-
ing. Patent and copyright law vest in right holders a broad power to recon-
figure the standard bundle of rights they receive through private licensing
and other transactions.80 Right holders are at liberty to restrict their rights
substantively (by giving away certain use permits but not others), temporally
(by imposing time limits on licenses given to others), and geographically (by
giving others use rights in certain geographic locations but not others). At
the same time, as we noted,81 registration requirements in intellectual prop-
erty law are quite limited. Hence, the information costs that the current
uniform design imposes are significant. As we will explain,82 our proposal
can actually reduce information costs, both by limiting the scope of overall
protection and by imposing formal requirements that would make it
cheaper for third parties to verify the content of intellectual property rights.
77. Merrill & Smith, supra note 76, at 26–34.
78. E.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The
Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. Legal Stud. S373, S374 (2002);
Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Objectivity of Well-Being and the Objectives of Property Law, 78
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1669, 1731–33 (2003).
79. Merrill & Smith, supra note 76, at 4–5, 38–40.
80. E.g., Mark A. Lemley, Contracting Around Liability Rules, 100 Calif. L. Rev. 463
(2012) (showing that the same dynamic can occur when intellectual property rights are pro-
tected by liability rules); Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property
Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 Calif. L. Rev. 1293 (1996) (discussing how intel-
lectual property holders reconfigure their rights in response to changing market conditions).
For a general discussion of the phenomenon of reconfiguring rights in property and intellec-
tual property, see Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in Three
Dimensions, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1015 (2008).
81. See supra Section I.A.2.
82. See infra Section III.C.
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II. A Self-Tailored System of Intellectual Property Protection
In this Part, we propose a new direction for intellectual property protec-
tion. In particular, we provide the mechanics of our proposal; in the next
Part, we examine more closely the incentives created by our proposed system
and its overall effects. Since the basics of our proposed self-tailored system
are similar for patent and copyright, we begin with a very general sketch of
these two fields and subsequently explain the elements of our proposal that
are common to these areas of intellectual property. We then elucidate how
our proposed system would work for patent and copyright individually. We
close by offering some observations common to both fields of intellectual
property law.
As a preliminary matter, our proposal assumes that intellectual property
rights are granted solely to incentivize creation. Consequently, society bene-
fits by simultaneously incentivizing all cost-effective creation while paying
the lowest possible price (particularly in terms of rights granted) necessary
to incentivize creation.83 This view of intellectual property rights excludes
the idea that there is anything intrinsically wrong with nonconsensual use of
intellectual property. We are concerned with protecting the exclusive rights
of intellectual property owners only insofar as this protection ensures that
the creator realizes enough profit to justify her creative activity. As Professor
Balganesh writes, this expectation lies at the heart of the incentive theory of
intellectual property: “[c]reators [and inventors] are presumed to be rational
utility maximizers and therefore capable of being induced to create by the
prospect of controlling a future market for their yet-to-be-created
works.”84 Once this profit margin is reached, infringements do not bother us
at all.
This is a simplifying assumption. We can imagine a system of intellec-
tual property protection that incorporates other aims of society. For in-
stance, society might wish to protect creators’ rights for reasons other than
incentivizing creation, and the law might therefore offer additional protec-
tions for creators, including “moral rights.” Of course, so long as incentiviz-
ing creation remains a goal of this alternative system, aspects of our proposal
would still be valuable. Our system, though, would have to be modified or
added to in order to incorporate other goals of the intellectual property
system.
83. For discussions of the centrality of incentivizing creators to American copyright and
patent law, see, for example, Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98
Va. L. Rev. 1745, 1746 (2012) (noting that “[a]ccording to the dominant American theory of
intellectual property, copyright and patent laws are premised on providing creators with just
enough incentive to create”), and William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Eco-
nomic Structure of Intellectual Property Law 4–5 (2003).
84. Balganesh, supra note 34, at 1573.
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A. An Overview of Patent and Copyright
Before introducing our self-tailored system, we briefly review the
mechanics of extant patent and copyright law, beginning with the law of
patents.
Under current patent law in the United States, inventors can obtain legal
protection for inventions that are novel, non-obvious, and useful, so long as
the invention is of a patentable subject matter.85 Traditionally, the first in-
ventor to create the invention obtained the law’s protection.86 Today, the
United States has begun transitioning to a first-to-file system in which prior-
ity goes to the first inventor to register her invention rather than the first to
invent it.87
U.S. law has always required registration as a condition of patent protec-
tion.88 Inventors must disclose their inventions to the Patent and Trademark
Office (“PTO”) in a patent application that enables others to replicate the
invention.89 Patent examiners at the PTO can decide whether to accept or
reject a patent application,90 but the courts get the last word. If the PTO
rejects the patent application, the applicant has the right to administrative
appeals as well as resort to courts of law.91 Even if the PTO approves the
application and issues the patent, courts may always reject the patent after
the fact as improvidently granted;92 in fact, studies show that, in patent liti-
gation, courts ultimately reject nearly half of patents that are challenged.93
Patents convey to the owner the right to prevent others from engaging
in the manufacture, sale, offer for sale, use, or importation of the protected
invention.94 The patent rights endure for twenty years,95 with the exception
of design patents, which receive only fourteen years of protection.96 Because
patents grant only the negative right to prevent others’ actions97 but not the
affirmative right to use the invention, there may be some cases where no one
can use a patented invention for an extended time. For instance, a newly
patented drug may lack approval by the Food and Drug Administration. In
85. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2012).
86. See Margreth Barrett, Intellectual Property 40 (Emanuel Law Outlines Se-
ries, 2d ed. 2008) (“Subsections 102(a), (e), and (g), taken together, demonstrate the general
U.S. policy of reserving a patent for the first person to invent . . . .”).
87. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3, 125 Stat. 284, 285 (2011).
88. 35 U.S.C. §§ 153, 154.
89. Id. § 112.
90. Id. § 131.
91. Id. §§ 134, 141, 145.
92. See id. § 282(b) (listing invalidity of a patent as a defense in an infringement suit).
93. Shapiro, supra note 57, at 1028.
94. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(i).
95. Id. § 154(a)(2).
96. Id. § 173.
97. See id. § 154(a)(i) (including “the right to exclude others from . . . using . . . the
invention” (emphasis added)).
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that case, non-patent holders cannot use the drug due to patent law, and the
inventor cannot use the drug due to federal regulations related to drugs.
Patent law makes some allowance for this situation, giving patent owners the
opportunity to extend the term of certain patents due to regulatory
processes.98
Patent law imposes liability on two categories of people who have not
directly infringed the patented rights: those who actively induce infringe-
ment99 and those who engage in contributory infringement by selling, im-
porting, or offering certain products that others will use to infringe.100
Together, the two types of liability for noninfringing parties are generally
called secondary liability.
The remedies imposed by law for patent infringement include injunctive
relief,101 actual damages,102 defendant’s profits,103 treble damages,104 statutory
damages,105 and sometimes enhanced statutory damages.106
Copyright law protects original works of authorship that are fixed in a
tangible medium.107 Authors obtain protection for their works the moment
they fix them in that medium.108 Authors do not need to register their works
or otherwise notify the world of their creation. But works cannot be in-
fringed unless the infringer actually relies on a protected work.109 Thus, if a
user elsewhere in the country manages to reproduce the author’s expression
without ever having encountered the original work, there is no infringe-
ment. As Judge Hand observed, “if by some magic a man who had never
98. See id. § 156(a)(4) (allowing term extensions for products “subject to a regulatory
review period”); Karin L. Tyson, The Role of the Patent and Trademark Office Under 35 U.S.C.
Section 156, 54 Food & Drug L.J. 205 (1999) (detailing the extension process).
99. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).
100. Id. § 271(c).
101. Id. § 283.
102. Id. § 284 (directing courts to provide damages “adequate to compensate for the
infringement”).
103. Id. § 289 (allowing damages in the form of defendant’s profits only in the case of
design patent infringements).
104. Id. § 284.
105. 35 U.S.C. § 284 also provides that the court may award damages of a reasonable
royalty.
106. 35 U.S.C. § 285 permits the court to award attorneys’ fees if the patent holder is
already entitled to damages.
107. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
108. See id. (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in
any tangible medium of expression . . . .” (emphasis added)); H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 52
(1976) (“[T]he concept of fixation is important since it not only determines whether the pro-
visions of the statute apply to a work, but it also represents the dividing line between common
law and statutory protection.”).
109. See Paul K. Saint-Amour, The Copywrights: Intellectual Property and the
Literary Imagination 7 (2003) (“Copyright does not even stipulate that ‘original’ works be
different from preexisting ones, only that they be the products of creative exertion rather than
outright copying.”).
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known it were to compose anew Keats’s Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would
[himself] be an ‘author,’ ” and he would not have infringed Keats’s rights.110
The owner of a copyright in a work has the exclusive right to reproduce,
adapt, distribute, display, and perform the protected work.111 In addition to
owners’ rights, authors have several rights that they retain even if they trans-
fer ownership of the protected work. These include rights of attribution and
integrity for works of visual art,112 and, in most cases, the right to terminate
transfers of ownership of any works.113 There are no general-use rights pro-
tected by copyright, so an owner of a copy of a protected work may use it in
any way that does not abridge the specific exclusive rights of the owner or
author.
Copyrighted works are protected for extremely long terms. Under cur-
rent law, a new work is generally protected for the life of the author plus
another 70 years,114 although for some types of works and authors, the term
of protection is 95 years from publication or 120 years from creation.115
Although there is no statutory provision for secondary liability in copy-
right law, case law has established two kinds of secondary infringement:
contributory and vicarious.116 Many of secondary infringement’s rules are
similar to those in patent law, and courts often draw from patent law in
shaping copyright doctrines of secondary liability.117
Copyright law provides for remedies including injunctive relief,118 actual
damages,119 defendant’s profits,120 statutory damages,121 and sometimes en-
hanced statutory damages.122 In order to benefit from statutory damages,
owners must have registered copyright in the protected work no later than
the earlier of three months after first publication or one month after the
110. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936).
111. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
112. Id. § 106A.
113. Id. §§ 203(a), 304(c).
114. Id. § 302(a).
115. Id. §§ 302(a), (c).
116. Sverker K. Högberg, Note, The Search for Intent-Based Doctrines of Secondary Liability
in Copyright Law, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 909, 914 (2006) (“Although the Copyright Act does not
explicitly proscribe indirect copyright infringement, the federal courts have adopted two com-
mon law secondary-liability doctrines—vicarious liability and contributory infringement—
from tort law.” (footnote omitted)).
117. The most important case is this regard is Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 420–21, 442 (1984), in which the Supreme Court relied on the
“staple article of commerce” in patent law to determine the secondary liability of technology
providers for copyright infringements committed by users.
118. 17 U.S.C. § 502.
119. Id. § 504(a)(1).
120. Id.
121. Id. § 504(c).
122. Id. § 504(d).
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copyright owner learns of the infringement.123 In order to file any kind of
suit, the owner must register the copyright at any time prior to the suit.
B. The Mechanics of Self-Tailored Rights
We now introduce our self-tailored system against the background of
extant patent and copyright law.
The basic concept animating our self-tailored system is that intellectual
property rights should be neither automatic nor uniform. Our proposed sys-
tem requires creators to buy their legal protection by paying a fee for their
rights. Importantly, unlike current law, our proposed scheme would require
registration of all covered intellectual property rights, even copyright. Rights
would be considered invalid unless and until they were registered. Initial
registration would be required to obtain the minimum package of rights
guaranteed by law. One year later, creators would face mandatory reregistra-
tion, in which they would be required to specify what package of legal pro-
tections they want for their creations—either the full package offered by the
law or smaller self-tailored packages, which run all the way down to a mini-
mum package containing only a few rights for a short time, enforceable only
against direct infringers.124 The creator’s choice of legal protection, in turn,
would establish the fee that the creator would have to pay. Naturally, the size
of the fee would depend on the amount of legal protection purchased. The
minimum package of rights would be available for free, while the full pack-
age would cost the maximum fee.125
In our self-tailored system, the protection process would begin with the
creator or inventor. We envision the following time line:
Figure 1.
The Self-Tailored System’s Protection Process
t0. Invention process 
begins
t1. Registration and 
market
t2. Reregistration t3. Lawsuit and payment 
by inventor
123. Id. § 412.
124. In the context of adaptation rights in copyright law, Balganesh proposes that authors
receive protection only for foreseeable uses of their works—unforeseeable uses would be un-
protected. Balganesh, supra note 34. Unlike us, however, Balganesh does not put a price on
foreseeable uses but rather allows authors to receive protection for free with respect to all such
uses. Id.
125. We describe our pricing scheme in greater detail later in this Part. See discussion infra
Section II.E.
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At t0, the creator would commence the creative process. At t1, she would
register the relevant creation after having perfected it. She could begin mar-
keting it at this time but would be guaranteed only one year of copyright or
patent protection. During this first year, the inventor would receive the full
set of patent and copyright protections, which would allow her to test the
market.
At the end of this year, the creator would be required to choose the
extent of her rights. At this point—t2—she would reregister her creation and
specify the “price” of infringing her chosen legal protections. The creator’s
chosen price of infringement would then serve as the basis for calculating
the size of the fee the creator would have to pay for her legal rights. The year
of market testing between t1 and t2 would give the creator access to the infor-
mation necessary to choose a price optimizing her profits from the creation.
It is important to note that the creator would not be required to pay this
fee upon registration at t1 or at reregistration at t2. She would make the
actual payment at t3—when she seeks to enforce her rights. As we shall ex-
plain, the fee that the creator would eventually have to pay would be calcu-
lated based on this chosen price of infringement but would not be identical
to the price.
The next piece of the puzzle is deciding what legal protections the crea-
tor would be able to purchase. To explain our proposal, we must take a step
back and examine the components of extant intellectual property law. For
simplicity’s sake, let us begin by dividing the basic components of intellec-
tual property protection into four categories. Under current law, the creator
of a protected piece of intellectual property receives (1) an exclusive set of
rights; (2) that can be enforced against certain classes of people; (3) for a
specified period of time; and (4) that are backed by a particular set of
remedies.
Extant law establishes the scope of all four of these elements in fixed
amounts and automatically awards them to each new qualified item of intel-
lectual property. For instance, when an author creates a new copyrightable
work of authorship and properly fixes it in a tangible medium, she automat-
ically receives the set of rights specified in copyright law (such as the right to
reproduce, adapt, display, and distribute)126 for a period fixed by law (gener-
ally for the life of the author plus seventy years)127 that is backed by a speci-
fied set of remedies (primarily rights to injunctive relief, statutory damages,
and compensatory damages, as well as potential criminal penalties),128 and
that can be enforced against direct infringers of the rights as well as “secon-
dary infringers.”129 Current law slightly varies the package of legal protec-
tions according to very broad categories of works. Architectural works, for
126. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
127. Id. § 302(a).
128. Id. §§ 502, 504, 506.
129. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434–35 (1984);
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 61 (1976) (recognizing the liability of contributory infringers of
copyrights).
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instance, carry slightly different rights than do graphic works.130 But such
variations are beyond the author’s control. If an author writes a novel, for
instance, she cannot unilaterally change the package of rights; she cannot,
for instance, establish at the outset that her rights will last for only twenty
years or that her rights will not be enforceable by statutory damages. At best,
the author can offer to others licenses to undertake activities protected by
the author’s exclusive rights—but such licenses cannot permanently elimi-
nate the copyright owner’s rights.131
By contrast, in our proposal, upon creating any item protected by intel-
lectual property law, the creator would have to choose from a menu specify-
ing terms of protection, protected rights, classes of potential infringers, and
available remedies. We do not suggest eliminating the protections provided
by current law. The list of terms, rights, classes of infringers, and remedies in
our proposed system would all be based on the current list of protections in
the law. Yet the creator would have to pay for each right, for each term of
protection, for each class of infringer, and for each available remedy.
For instance, a novelist could buy the full set of rights offered by law for
her novel: the exclusive rights to reproduce, adapt (i.e., prepare derivative
works from the novel), distribute, perform, and display.132 Or she might
waive the performance and display rights and buy only protection against
reproduction, adaptation, and distribution. Similarly, she could purchase
the full protection period of lifetime plus seventy years.133 Alternatively, she
could purchase protection for only ten or twenty or fifty years. She could
likewise purchase the full set of extant protections of entitlement to injunc-
tive relief, compensatory damages, and statutory damages,134 or she could
waive the injunctive rights and purchase only the right to compensation. She
could buy the right to sue all secondary infringers as well as primary infring-
ers, or she could waive the right to sue contributory infringers or other
secondary infringers.
How would the creator choose her package of legal protections? And
why would she ever choose anything less than the maximum set of
protections?
The answer can be found in the fees our system would require creators
to pay for intellectual property rights. Our proposal would demand that
creators pay a large fee that would differ according to two variables: the
package of legal protections and the “price” of infringement as established
by the creator.
130. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 120(a) (describing the scope of “exclusive rights in architectural
works”), with id. § 106A (describing the scope of rights to attribution and integrity in visual
art works).
131. Id. § 203(a)(5) (making the author’s right to terminate a license agreement
inalienable).
132. See id. § 106.
133. See id. § 302(a).
134. See id. §§ 502, 504, 506.
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We propose that the fee for the full package of legal protections should
be some fixed percentage of the price of infringement. For simplicity’s sake,
in this Part, we assume that the fixed percentage would be set at 1% of the
full price. That means that creators could obtain a full set of rights for the
full term of legal protection backed by the full set of legal remedies against
all parties in exchange for payment of a fee equal to 1% of the infringement
price established by the creator. The creator could set any price of infringe-
ment she chooses, and the fee would then vary according to the fixed per-
centage established by law. For instance, a creator who believed her work to
be extraordinarily valuable could specify an infringement price of $100 mil-
lion. The cost of this protection would be large; if she wanted the full set of
legal rights, she would have to pay a $1 million fee for them. A creator who
believed the value of the work to be low—for instance, only $100—but who
still wished to obtain the full package of legal protections would pay a much
smaller amount—only $1—to protect her rights.
Naturally, this system appears to incentivize owners to declare a low
price of infringement in order to reduce the fees they would have to pay for
legal protection. To avoid this difficulty, our model would provide creators
with a powerful incentive not to understate the price: in our proposal, the
price of infringement would also set the cap for all future remedies the crea-
tor could receive. Thus, only a high price of infringement would allow the
creator to obtain substantial damage awards.
In addition to permitting creators to specify a low price of infringement,
our proposal would offer creators a second way to reduce the fee they would
have to pay for legal protection. Creators could choose less-inclusive pack-
ages of legal protection, thereby reducing fees even for a high price of in-
fringement. For instance, creators might choose shorter terms of protection,
or smaller lists of rights, and have to pay only .2% or .5% of the price of
infringement (i.e., only 20% or 50% of the fee for full protection).
In one extreme case, each intellectual property right would enjoy a free
set of protections. For instance, the minimum protection for a copyrighted
work might be a five-year term protected only by monetary relief and good
only against primary infringers. The fee for this minimal package would be
0% of the price—that is, nothing. Thus, intellectual property would always
enjoy a minimum level of protection. At the other extreme, the creator
would get the entire package of protections available under current law, for
the “full” fee (1% of the price, in our example).
It is clear that, under our proposal, even for small packages of protected
rights, fees might turn out to be quite substantial. Fortunately for the crea-
tor, our proposal would not require paying the entire fee immediately upon
registering the intellectual property right and selecting the package of legal
protections. Rather, upon registration, the creator would pay a small
amount reflecting the clerical costs of registering rights (for illustrative pur-
poses, let’s imagine the amount as $25). The creator would pay the remain-
der of the fee only at the moment she files her first infringement suit.
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At this point, it is important to explain the precise relationship between
the price of infringement and the remedies that would be available to own-
ers of intellectual property. For monetary remedies, the relationship would
be straightforward. The price of infringement would serve as a cap on the
total monetary damages (compensatory and statutory) that could be realized
by the intellectual property owner during the term of protection. Once the
total damages reach the cap, the owner would no longer be able to obtain
any monetary damages from future infringers. For instance, the novelist who
had specified a $100-million value for her novel (and who had paid a $1-
million fee to buy the full set of legal protections) would be able to collect
damages from numerous potential infringers before reaching the cap. The
novelist who valued her work at $100 would likely reach the cap in the first
successful lawsuit.
The relationship between the price of infringement and injunctive relief
is more complicated. In our proposal, no matter what the price of infringe-
ment, as long as the total cap on damages has not yet been exceeded, cre-
ators of intellectual property works would be entitled to injunctive relief as
they are under existing law. Even after the issuance of the injunction, how-
ever, the potential user against whom the injunction was issued would be
able to force the sale of a license by paying permanent damages, effectively
lifting the injunction. This means that, under our proposal, courts would
not issue unconditional injunctions. Instead, for any given injunctive order,
the court would issue an accompanying alternative order of permanent
damages, which the defendant could pay as an alternative to continuing to
obey the injunction.135 The price of infringement—or what remains of it
after previous damages have partially exhausted the rights of the creator—
would serve as the upper limit of the court order of permanent damages. If
the cap had already been reached—that is, if all the allowable damages
under the price of infringement had already been paid due to previous law-
suits—the court could not issue an injunction.
Statutory damages would also be available in our proposal, but they,
too, would count against the damage cap established by the creator-specified
price of infringement. Criminal sanctions against users would not be availa-
ble at all.
C. Tailoring Patent and Copyright
Having generally provided the basics of our self-tailored system of pro-
tection, we now explain the system in greater detail in relation to the sub-
fields of patent and copyright. We begin with patent law.
Patent law provides ample room for self-tailored rights. As noted above,
in our system, the package of rights to be tailored is composed of four cate-
gories: (1) the set of exclusive rights; (2) the classes of people against whom
135. The mechanism of permitting defendants to pay an award of “permanent damages”
and thereby lift the injunction is well known in case law. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co.,
257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970) (conditioning an injunction on the nonpayment of permanent
damages).
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the rights may be enforced; (3) the period of time for which the rights can
be enforced; and (4) the set of remedies backing the rights.136
Let us begin with the exclusive rights. Patent law protects four different
kinds of exclusive rights: manufacture, use, sale, and import. For some kinds
of inventions, the sale rights might be the most valuable; for others, the use
rights. Each right could be sold separately or together as a package. For in-
stance, inventors could take the full package of all four sets of rights or a
lesser package of, say, selling and importing only. The smallest packages
would be any of the four rights standing alone.
The second set of options for tailoring packages of rights can be found
in the targeted classes of people against whom rights could be enforced. The
full package would allow suits against primary infringers, inducers, and con-
tributory infringers. The smaller packages would allow suits against only two
or one of these classes of infringers.
The terms of protection would be most readily tailored. Packages could
vary from a minimum term (of a single year, for example) to the maximum
term of twenty years plus potential extensions. Smaller packages might be
available year by year or perhaps only in blocs of several years. Additionally,
packages might include or exclude the possibility of obtaining extensions
due to regulatory activities.
The final set of options for packaging rights would concern available
remedies. Here, all packages would be centered on an inventor-specified
price of infringement that would cap damages. The full package would add
to this the rights to injunctive relief (subject to purchase by the infringer, as
specified supra in Section II.B), statutory damages, enhanced damages (such
as treble damages), and profits. Lesser packages would waive one or more of
these rights. The minimum package would provide relief only for actual
damages up to the cap of the price of infringement.
It is important to note that patent law already requires registration as a
condition for acquiring legal rights. Unlike copyright and trademark law, for
instance, patent law denies intellectual property protection to inventions
that are not registered with the PTO.137 In addition, utility patents are sub-
ject to periodic reregistration, in the form of paying maintenance fees. In
order to maintain such patents, patent owners must pay fees ranging from
several hundred to several thousand dollars138 three times during the life of
the patent (approximately at three, seven, and eleven years).139
Thus, patent law already allows for a small amount of self-tailoring of
rights. Our proposal would greatly expand that self-tailoring.
As with patent law, it is not difficult to contrive packages of rights that
could be offered to copyright owners. There are eight basic kinds of exclusive
rights granted to authors under copyright law, if one includes termination
136. See supra Section II.B.
137. See 35 U.S.C. § 111 (2012).
138. The current fee schedule is available at Fee Schedule, U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off.,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/ope/fee010114.htm (last revised May 12, 2014).
139. 37 C.F.R. § 1.20(e)–(g) (2013).
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rights and the moral rights that attach to works of visual art: reproduction,
adaptation, distribution, display, performance, termination, integrity, and
attribution. Each right could be sold separately or together as a package.
Creators could purchase a full package of all six to eight rights (depending
on whether the work is one of visual art) or lesser packages of as few as a
single right. As with patent, packages could also be tailored according to the
targeted classes of people against whom rights could be enforced, from a full
package allowing suits against primary infringers, vicarious infringers, and
contributory infringers to smaller packages allowing suits against only two
or one of these classes. The packages associated with available remedies
should be similar to those presented in the context of patent law and cen-
tered on a creator-specified price of infringement that would cap damages.
Given the extremely long duration of copyright protection, it is quite
easy to draft different packages of terms of rights. The minimum package
could have a very short minimum term (perhaps only 1 year or 5 years),
while the maximum package could include maximum terms of 70 years plus
life, 120 years from creation, or 95 years from publication. Again, it should
be possible to draft smaller packages by the length of term.
D. Optimizing Packages
Our proposed system has envisioned a great deal of self-tailoring, al-
lowing creators to vary their rights along four dimensions with few limita-
tions: legal rights, term of rights, targeted defendants, and remedies. An
alternative strategy would reduce the number of packages to a small set of
popular configurations.
The Creative Commons project employs an example of this latter strat-
egy. An organization founded in 2001 as part of a movement to increase the
number of copyrightable works in the public domain, Creative Commons
has released several model license agreements that owners of copyrighted
works can use to waive some of their rights for the benefit of users.140 Crea-
tive Commons licenses are based on four modules—Attribution, NonCom-
mercial, ShareAlike, and NoDerivatives—which consist of a set of
restrictions on users.141 For instance, the NonCommercial module forbids
commercial use of the works, while the Attribution module forbids use
without attributing the work to the original owner.142 The modules can be
combined with one another and a waiver of the owners’ other rights to pro-
duce a set of licenses allowing users to use the work in all but the manner
forbidden by the modules. The theoretical result is sixteen possible licenses
140. History, Creative Commons, http://creativecommons.org/about/history (last visited
May 14, 2014).
141. Creative Commons provides an explanation of the licenses at Frequently Asked Ques-
tions, Creative Commons, http://wiki.creativecommons.org/FAQ (last visited May 19, 2014).
142. Id.
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from which owners can choose,143 although Creative Commons forces own-
ers’ hands on some of the modules, and it therefore lists only six “major”
licenses.144
Obviously, the Creative Commons licenses do not exhaust all of the
possible configurations of open licenses that owners could potentially em-
ploy. Indeed, Creative Commons itself suggests to authors several other
open licenses that other groups have developed.145 The Creative Commons
strategy for licenses thus sacrifices completeness for comprehension. Instead
of offering copyright owners a full menu of licensing choices, Creative Com-
mons focuses on sets of rights that it deems most likely to meet authors’
needs and to advance the organization’s goal of increasing the number and
quality of works available to the general public.
Under our system, in designing packages of rights, lawmakers will simi-
larly have to choose between completeness and comprehension. Our propo-
sal offers creators many choices, but it does not offer complete freedom. For
instance, we imagine packages containing a right to exclusivity in use or
exclusivity in creating derivative works. More precisely tailored packages
could define particular kinds of uses and particular kinds of derivative
works. At the same time, our proposal offers greater freedom to tailor than
does the set of licenses suggested by Creative Commons.
E. Pricing Packages
Up to this point, we have described possible ways to package intellectual
property rights for inventors and creators to purchase, but we have said little
about how to price the different packages. In describing our proposal, we
posited a fee of 1% of the price of infringement. While this figure was
merely illustrative, it demonstrates how our system could be operational-
ized—in particular since it shows that even a relatively small charge can
bring about an intellectual property system that differs dramatically from
the one we know.
In setting the actual fee for intellectual property protection, policymak-
ers will have to balance two competing policy concerns. On the one hand,
the initial charge should be substantial enough to prompt producers of intel-
lectual property works to consider it when selecting how much protection to
procure. For this reason, a token fee consisting of a tiny fraction of the dam-
ages cap would not do. If policymakers were to impose a .0001% charge,
creators would not likely relinquish any protection voluntarily, and we
would find ourselves with a system much like the one we know today. On
143. There are sixteen (24) possible combinations of four-module decisions.
144. A current list of the major licenses is available at About the Licenses, Creative Com-
mons, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ (last visited May 19, 2014) (Attribution, Attribu-
tion-ShareAlike, Attribution-NoDerivatives, Attribution-NonCommercial, Attribution-
NonCommercial-ShareAlike, and Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives).
145. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 141 (“We recommend against using Creative
Commons licenses for software. . . . We recommend considering licenses made available by the
Free Software Foundation or listed as ‘open source’ by the Open Source Initiative.”).
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the other hand, the charge cannot be too high, lest it substantially erode
incentives to produce the work in the first place. For example, imposing a
fee of as much as 50% of the total price of infringement would seriously
deter production of intellectual property, especially by risk-averse individu-
als and small firms. This result would be highly undesirable.
While theoretical considerations can guide us in the task of pricing dif-
ferent bundles, the question is ultimately empirical in nature. The best way
to set the fees is to base the calculations on empirical data. At present we
lack data telling us exactly what combination of rights is necessary to incen-
tivize different kinds of creations. But—in what we view as another potential
advantage of our proposal—implementing our system would provide
lawmakers with the data they need to set accurate fees that correspond to
different levels of protection.
On top of its other advantages, the system we propose is information
forcing. It relies on creators selecting their legal protections from menus.
One of the well-known virtues of menus is that they allow self-screening in a
way that one-size-fits-all protection cannot.146 By offering intellectual prop-
erty owners different bundles of protection and inviting them to choose
among them, our system collects valuable information about the nature of
the incentives necessary to underwrite production of intangible items. This
information could be used to better price and tailor future menus without
unduly diminishing incentives to create. Naturally, this result would be
achieved through a process of trial and error. Optimal pricing would not
likely emerge instantaneously. Over time, though, through a process of peri-
odic adjustments, the fees would approximate a price that strikes the right
balance between incentivizing creativity and avoiding excessive protection.
III. Implications of Self-Tailored Intellectual Property Rights
Several important benefits emerge from adopting a bottom-up, fee-
based, self-tailored intellectual property system.
First, the self-tailored system would force patentees and creators to take
into account the costs they impose on society at large. It is true, of course,
that a world without intellectual property protection would not sufficiently
incentivize creation. Intellectual property laws incentivize creation by grant-
ing inventors the right to exclusive enjoyment of many of the benefits that
their inventions bestow on society.147 But current intellectual property laws
also impose costs on society by creating monopolies and by encouraging
potentially excessive litigation.148 Extant intellectual property laws do not
146. See generally Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 3 (2006) (discussing the
ways in which menus change contractual relations and affect decisionmaking).
147. E.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (giving the U.S. Congress the power to grant patents
and copyrights in order to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts”); Mazer v. Stein,
347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress
to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by
personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare . . . .”).
148. See supra Section I.A.1.
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force inventors and creators to take account of these costs. Thus, the law
today encourages creators to take advantage of rights that are both harmful
to society and of greater scope than necessary to incentivize creation. Our
system would lead inventors and creators to tailor their intellectual property
protection to fit their needs, thus preserving incentives to create and inno-
vate while lowering the anticompetitive effects stemming from intellectual
property protection. While it is impossible to predict in the abstract the
magnitude of this benefit per any given intellectual work, it is important to
understand that in the aggregate the effect may be significant.
Second, self-tailored protection would increase the use of existing works.
The excessive protections offered by extant law tend to harm consumers,
both by reducing access and by raising the price of products.149 Our self-
tailored system leaves consumers in the same position only in the event that
creators and inventors choose the full package of rights. But given the finan-
cial incentives, creators and inventors would often choose smaller packages
of rights. And where the fees associated with self-tailored protection lead
creators to choose a smaller package of rights, consumers necessarily benefit.
By reducing the scope of intellectual property protection, our self-tailored
system would ensure consumers quicker, broader, and cheaper access to
protected works.
In this respect, our system can be thought of as generating the same
effect as the Creative Commons movement, except much more effectively
and on a much greater scale. The movement applies only to copyrighted
works150 and relies solely on ideological or personal incentives. Our propo-
sal, by contrast, also extends to patents and would employ monetary incen-
tives in addition to ideological and personal ones. By lessening the overall
amount of intellectual property protection, our system would enhance the
use of existing works, reduce the potential for holdups and misuse of rights,
and ease pressure on the courts.
Third, and just as importantly, the narrower scope of protection that
would result from our self-tailored system would create more elbow room
for future creators and innovators. In the age of remixes and follow-on inno-
vation, inventors and creators are some of the most important consumers of
protected intellectual property.151 Greater consumer access to intellectual
property means, inter alia, greater access for inventors and creators. Our
self-tailored system’s narrower scope of intellectual property rights would
reduce the need for follow-on inventors to expend resources in order to
secure permissions from preexisting right holders (or design around their
149. See supra Section I.A.1.
150. Séverine Dusollier, The Master’s Tools v. The Master’s House: Creative Commons v.
Copyright, 29 Colum. J.L. & Arts 271, 274 (2006) (“The main purpose of Creative Commons
parallels that of the free software movement which seeks to use copyright to authorize, rather
than inhibit, copying, distribution, modification and re-use of software and other copyrighted
works.”).
151. See generally Lawrence Lessig, Remix: Making Art and Commerce Thrive in
the Hybrid Economy (2008).
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protection). It would enable those innovators instead to focus their re-
sources and attention on producing new intellectual property. In other
words, our system has the potential to improve the terms of the temporal
trade-off implicated by intellectual property protection in favor of future
creators without meaningfully weakening the production incentives for cur-
rent copyright holders and patentees.
Finally, we expect self-tailored protection to benefit the legal system by
reducing the number of cases that go to court. The reduction in the total
number of intellectual property rights should bring down the number of
suits filed. Furthermore, we expect cases to be less complicated and time
consuming on account of a drop in the number of rights asserted in every
suit. The incentive effects of our self-tailored system deserve further explica-
tion, and in the remainder of this Part, we discuss those effects in greater
detail. We can already note, however, that the self-tailored system should
greatly reduce the inefficiencies of current litigation and encourage creators
to favor voluntary market transactions over litigation.
In the remainder of this Part, we look to the incentives created by self-
tailored protection and then turn the spotlight on our system’s impact on
non-practicing right holders, widely known in the literature as “trolls.” We
conclude by pointing to several additional benefits of our proposal.
A. Incentives of the Self-Tailored System
Our self-tailored protection system aims to reduce protections claimed
by authors and inventors while preserving, as much as possible, the existing
law of intellectual property protection. Thus, our system does not funda-
mentally change the kinds of protections offered by intellectual property law
or the kinds of intellectual property protected by law. Our system does not
mandate reducing intellectual property protection, and it does not propose
any new substantive barriers to obtaining protection. Rather, our self-tai-
lored system is based on charging creators fees for the protections they se-
lect. These fees would guide creators in deciding how much protection they
wish to secure for their inventions and expressive works.
The effect of our self-tailored system on the world of intellectual prop-
erty thus hinges on its effect on the incentives of creators. Our aim is to
create a system that lowers the amount of protection the law offers while
preserving incentives for creation. To accomplish this aim, the system must
set fees paid by creators at a level that deters creators from purchasing exces-
sive levels of protection. Naturally, by conditioning protection on payment,
our system runs the risk that, on the margin, some works will never be
created.
Still, for two reasons, we believe that the risk of significantly deterring
innovation is quite small. First, creators would still have the ability to reduce
the fees they pay for intellectual property protection by purchasing only
those rights from which they expect to profit most highly. This means that it
would be rare for the fee paid by creators to be so large as to push a creator
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past the margin where it is no longer valuable to create. Second, since cre-
ators would have to pay the fee only upon initiating an infringement suit,
creators could limit their exposure to the risk of payment. If a piece of intel-
lectual property turned out to be less profitable than hoped, its creator could
avoid paying a disproportionately large fee by essentially abandoning her
rights to sue.
Furthermore, creators would need to pay their fee only at the point of
registration, when the invention or work of authorship is already complete.
Thus, the fee would affect only ex ante creation incentives to the extent that
they are excessive in comparison with expected profit. At the moment of
registration, however, creators would choose fees in line with the expected
profit from the work, based on what they know from the period of develop-
ment. Because creators could choose their fees according to their level of
confidence in the work and the range of remedies and time necessary to
maximize profits, creators could limit the downside risk of fees while main-
taining the upside profit potential. Thus, it would be in only the rarest of
cases that the risk of fees would deter potential creators.
Note that the current scheme of patent-maintenance fees—the payment
of fees in roughly the third, seventh, and eleventh year of utility patents as a
condition of maintaining the patents152—already provides some indication
of self-tailoring’s likely impact on ex ante incentives. Maintenance fees are,
of course, far less nuanced than our proposed self-tailoring scheme. But, at
their core, these fees require that inventors take account ex ante of the possi-
bility that their rights may be sharply curtailed if they fail to make subse-
quent payments in support of continued intellectual property rights. The
existence of today’s maintenance-fee scheme thus further suggests that our
proposal for self-tailored rights would not significantly undermine ex ante
incentives to create relative to extant law.
Yet while the self-tailored system would preserve the basic incentive to
create, it would alter creators’ decisions regarding how and when to pursue
intellectual property rights. Aside from incentives in litigation (which we
examine more closely in the next Section),153 the most important impact on
creators’ incentives concerns the division of intellectual property rights
among multiple creations or inventions. For example, imagine an author
considering whether to release a two-volume work of fiction or a single
novel containing roughly the same story. Our self-tailored system would
provide the author with an incentive to divide the fictional work into two
parts rather than keep it as one. If she were to publish the fictional work in
two separate volumes, she could pay for a smaller package of rights for the
initial volume and test the market. If the first volume proved popular, the
author could then pay for a larger set of rights (with a higher price of in-
fringement) for the second work. If the first volume were unpopular, how-
ever, the author could avoid high expenditures on rights for the second
volume. More generally, any time inventions or creations could be divided
152. See supra notes 138–139 and accompanying text.
153. See infra Section III.B.
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into several parts, creators might find it useful to divide the work so as to
obtain pricing information to guide the choice of future selections of intel-
lectual property rights.
There is no reason to believe that this sort of division of intellectual
property works would be harmful. Indeed, the extensive practice of aggre-
gating patent portfolios, and licensing entire portfolios rather than individ-
ual patents, suggests that dividing creations into synergistic smaller parts can
be quite salutary.154
B. Litigation, “Trolling,” and the Self-Tailored System
Our system of self-tailored rights would greatly impact litigation over
intellectual property rights. Two factors in particular would impact the liti-
gation incentives of intellectual property owners. First, our system would
require these owners to pay a fee for their rights only upon their initial
infringement action. This would greatly increase the marginal cost of the
first infringement suit and greatly deter initial litigation. Second, our system
would cap all damages at the price of infringement specified by the creator.
This would lead intellectual property owners to tread carefully in filing law-
suits. Owners would certainly prefer to reach settlements or otherwise vol-
untarily sell or license rights in order to avoid reaching the cap. In addition,
owners might well prefer to concentrate their lawsuits against a few large
defendants rather than a large number of small defendants.
Let us begin with the impact on creators’ decisions whether to sue in-
fringers. In our model, litigation is essentially an option granted to creators
of intellectual property. Holders of intellectual property rights might choose
to exercise this option, but they would not have to. The ability not to exer-
cise the litigation option would reduce the downside risk of having to pay a
fee for a nonprofitable creation or invention. At the same time, it would
raise the marginal cost of the initial lawsuit. A patentee who purchased the
right to seek damages of up to $1 million and who purchased a full package
of rights would have to pay $10,000 (1% of $1 million) upon filing the first
infringement suit. The obligation to pay the $10,000 would not be condi-
tioned on the actual amount sought or that awarded by the court. Any suit
for any amount would trigger payment. Thus, if the amount requested by
the patentee were only $50,000, or even $5,000, she would have to pay the
full $10,000 she had been assessed when she registered the patent.
When creators have not yet litigated their rights, they might turn a blind
eye to trivial or small infringements. The reason is simple: it may not be
worth their while to pay the full charge they were assessed ($10,000 in our
example) to collect a relatively small amount, say $4,000 in damages. Of
course, intellectual property owners could threaten to sue small-time in-
fringers, but the threat would not be credible in most cases, and the subjects
154. Cf. Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1
(2005).
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of the threat would realize as much. The calculus would change dramati-
cally, however, if there were a large number of simultaneous small infringe-
ments. In that case, it would make sense for the right holder to pay the
charge and start suing. While each suit in isolation might not justify paying
the enforcement charge, in aggregation the amount the intellectual property
owner would expect to collect would justify payment. An interesting impli-
cation of this possibility is that small-time infringers would never be sure
that they could infringe with impunity. Their confidence in their immunity
from suit would depend not only on the size of their own infringement but
also on whether the owner had previously sued (and paid the fee) as well as
the number of similar infringers—factors they do not control and may not
be able to verify without incurring significant expenses.
Because initial lawsuits could turn out to be quite expensive, there might
be cases where intellectual property owners would decide not to sue at all.
Quite simply, after the owner has established a high price of infringement, it
might turn out that no infringer is worth suing. Even if no suit is filed,
however, the theoretical possibility would remain that a future serious in-
fringement would justify paying the charge and suing. This scenario raises
the possibility that the rights in many works would become “idle” for long
periods of time. Owners would simply lie in wait for many years until a
serious infringement occurs and would then sue for infringement. While
this might appear quite problematic, closer examination shows that it is not.
Under current law, it is already possible for patent and copyright owners
to wait for infringements and then leap forth to sue. This strategy is poten-
tially problematic for two reasons. First, right holders might eschew efficient
bargaining in favor of litigation, because societal subsidies of the legal system
may make litigation more lucrative for the individual right holder, even
though it is more expensive for society. Worse, right holders may wait until
their rivals make significant investments and only then sue for infringement.
This creates the possibility of holdups.
Our proposed system reduces the potential losses from these strategies
both by ending the possibility of true injunctive relief and, more generally,
by reducing the appeal of litigation. Under our system, there would be no
real injunctive relief, which dramatically reduces potential holdups. In our
system, all injunctions could potentially be commuted to monetary relief
and therefore could always be bought by defendants. At the same time, be-
cause our proposal would cap damages but not license fees, it would create
strong incentives for owners to avoid litigation. Thus, the incentives for
owners to lie in wait would be considerably reduced.
This last point warrants further explication. As we noted, our system
would cap all damages at the price of infringement specified by the creator.
This would provide a powerful incentive to reach license agreements in all
cases, even after lawsuits were filed. So long as courts never issue damage
judgments, owners could realize the price of infringement many times over.
This strength, however, could also be a vulnerability. Because intellectual
property owners would have such strong incentives to avoid court rulings,
users’ power in bargaining would be greatly enhanced. The result would be
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that the creator’s specified price would not only cap damages but would also
impact negotiations for consensual use.
Overall, we predict that our proposal would incentivize owners of intel-
lectual property to litigate less while facilitating more use of protected intel-
lectual property rights. In other words, our system would reduce artificial
incentives for transferring intellectual property rights through litigation
(which are subsidized) and would likely increase the number of efficient uses
of creations.
C. Other Benefits of the Self-Tailored System
The self-tailored system we propose yields two additional benefits. First,
because our self-tailored system would require owners to register their
choice of the legal rights that apply to their creations, potential users could
more easily discern the legal protections attached to any given work. This
would be particularly valuable for copyright, which currently protects works
even without registration.155 But even for patents, which must already be
registered under the current law,156 our self-tailored system would add value
by informing users of the nature and duration of the rights the patent owner
wishes to protect.
A second, and arguably more important, advantage of our system is that
in many cases it would lead to shorter de facto protection terms. Not only
would our system incentivize creators to establish shorter terms of protec-
tion with fewer protected rights, but it would also potentially end protection
even before the conclusion of the chosen term. Under our system, once an
inventor or a creator reached her self-selected protection cap, she could no
longer sue for infringement. For example, if Apple were to select a cap of $1
billion for all the patents asserted in its recent lawsuit against Samsung,157
and if a court of law were to find Samsung liable and order it to pay Apple
$1 billion in damages, subsequent infringers could use the relevant Apple
patents without risking liability.
More generally, under our system, once a right holder reaches the com-
pensation limit to which she is entitled based on her self-tailored protection
price, the protection effectively lapses. This may seem an anomalous result,
but it is not. The self-tailored system requires creators to set the price of
155. Mandatory registration (together with all other formalities) was abolished in 1989 by
the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853. For
criticisms, see Pamela Samuelson, Preliminary Thoughts on Copyright Reform, 2007 Utah L.
Rev. 551, 562–63 (rethinking the possibility of reintroducing formalities), and Christopher
Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 485 (2004) (calling for the reintroduc-
tion of formalities, albeit in a new form).
156. See 35 U.S.C. § 153 (2012).
157. Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 909 F. Supp. 2d 1147 (N.D. Cal. 2012), aff’d in
part, vacated in part, 735 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013), remanded to 2014 WL 60121 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 7, 2014).
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infringement at a level that sufficiently incentivizes creators to produce intel-
lectual property. Once the owner of the intellectual property right has real-
ized this amount through litigation, there is no need to offer any further
protection of the right. From the perspective of ex ante incentives, once an
author or an inventor produces a work and selects her preferred level of
protection, she essentially reveals that the level of compensation selected
would have sufficed to prompt her to produce the work. No doubt, all things
being equal, she would prefer to have the possibility of receiving a much
greater award, if the legal system were to accommodate this possibility. But
her desire for potentially greater revenues is not a relevant consideration for
a system aimed at incentivizing innovation. So long as the system preserves
incentives to create, efficiency demands that society strive to disseminate and
use the work as broadly as possible.
IV. Potential Objections
In this Part, we anticipate possible objections to our proposal and ad-
dress them as best we can. The challenges we foresee concern (1) the admin-
istrative costs that would attend our proposal; (2) the arguable superiority of
private ordering through market transactions as a means for introducing
differentiation among intellectual property rights; (3) the availability of an
alternative system of tailored rights by industry rather than by the choice of
the creator; and (4) the cognitive inability of inventors and authors to gauge
the scope of protection they would need.
A. Administrative Costs
The first potential objection to our proposal is that it would significantly
increase administrative costs relative to the current system. Our proposal
would greatly multiply the variations of intellectual property rights, protec-
tions, and remedies, thereby necessitating a more complex system of data
keeping. Patent and copyright offices all over the world would be required to
handle a much richer menu of intellectual property bundles. Furthermore,
those offices would have to ensure that they have accurately recorded the
precise scope of protection secured by each creator. Courts would have to
investigate the precise scope of rights and remedies that attach to each item
of intellectual property, and they could no longer rely on broad categories as
baselines.
While we do not deny that implementing our proposal would add com-
plexity to the system, we believe that the administrative-costs objection is
not nearly as powerful as it may first appear. Although implementing our
proposal would certainly add new intellectual property forms, it would not
introduce any new parameters. This means that our proposal would not
require PTO employees or the courts to learn new tasks. Nor would it re-
quire those employees to educate themselves about new substantive protec-
tion criteria.
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Furthermore, we expect that our proposal would decrease the overall
amount of intellectual property rights. Hence, our proposal involves a trade-
off between complexity of protection and extent of protection; the former
would increase and the latter would decrease. This increase in complexity
does not necessarily imply a corresponding rise in administrative costs.
In fact, because our system relies on self-registration, it is unlikely to
impose substantial new costs on administrative agencies. The patent and
copyright offices would simply have to compile a list of protection variables.
Creators and inventors would then be asked to select their preferred vari-
ables; once they finalized their selection, they would submit a form to the
relevant office. Thereafter, as a procedural precondition for filing an in-
fringement lawsuit, courts could require intellectual property owners to pro-
duce a receipt showing that they had paid for their rights. The creator or
inventor would initiate payment at her convenience, and the PTO could eas-
ily calculate the required fee based on the information already within the
system (the inventor’s selected price of infringement and package of
protections).
At the same time, the expected reduction in litigation would likely lower
the cost of administering the court system. And the wider scope of informa-
tion available from central registries would reduce search costs for potential
users. Overall, we predict that our system would not substantially increase—
and might even decrease—the administrative costs of protecting intellectual
property rights.
B. Private Ordering
A second objection to our proposal might be that it is unnecessary. The
one-size-fits-all system of current copyright and patent law creates uniform-
ity. Critics might claim, however, that this uniformity exists only de jure and
that, de facto, there is a lot of variance. The law is just the starting point, not
the end. As Professor Merges famously observed, a right holder can settle for
less protection than the law gives her.158 Nothing forces her to take advan-
tage of the full scope of protection that the law grants to her.
We do not disagree with this argument in principle. We concede that,
even under extant law, market transactions can lead to more narrowly (or
broadly) tailored intellectual property rights. The best example of this phe-
nomenon is the Creative Commons movement, which has resulted in a mul-
titude of copyright owners voluntarily relinquishing their rights.159 At its
core, Creative Commons offers creators an alternative menu of protection
forms, all of which fall short of the high protection mark offered by the
Copyright Act.160 This is no accident: Creative Commons proposes a set of
158. Merges, supra note 80.
159. See Michael W. Carroll, Creative Commons and the New Intermediaries, 2006 Mich.
St. L. Rev. 45, 47–49 (describing the structure of the Creative Commons movement).
160. See “Some Rights Reserved”: Building a Layer of Reasonable Copyright, Creative Com-
mons, https://wiki.creativecommons.org/History (last modified Apr. 28, 2011, 9:32 AM).
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protection defaults designed to enable authors to give up a portion of their
legal protection, thereby making more content available to users.161 Al-
though there is some debate in the academic community as to the success of
Creative Commons,162 we tend to side with the champions of the movement.
And yet the success of Creative Commons is perhaps the strongest data
point in support of our proposal. Neither we nor the movement’s strongest
supporters would argue that it has obviated the need for further reform or
legislative intervention.
There are several reasons for this. To begin with, extant law does not
permit owners of intellectual property rights perfect freedom in waiving
their rights. Copyright law provides two outstanding examples. The first in-
volves termination rights. Authors of copyrighted expressions have the right
to transfer ownership of their standard copyright rights (such as the right to
copy), but these authors also enjoy termination rights permitting them to
nullify the transfer within a statutorily specified window of time and recover
ownership of the copyright rights.163 The termination rights cannot be as-
signed or waived, meaning that even if the author contractually promises
never to terminate her transfer, the transferee may still find the rights he
acquired taken away by the author or her successors.164
The second example involves what are known as moral rights. Moral
rights in a copyrighted work include the right to “attribution” (the right,
when works are displayed, to have the author properly identified)165 and the
right to “integrity” (the right to protect the proper form of works and to
prevent their “mutilation”).166 Federal copyright law establishes limited
moral rights over works of visual art,167 and state168 and foreign169 copyright
law recognize a broader scope of moral rights and protected works. All the
moral rights share the feature of being personal and inalienable.170 Authors
161. See Carroll, supra note 159, at 48 (noting that Creative Commons offers copyright
holders the option to dedicate their works to the public domain).
162. See, e.g., Shun-ling Chen, To Surpass or to Conform—What are Public Licenses For?,
2009 U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol’y 107, 121–30; Zachary Katz, Pitfalls of Open Licensing: An
Analysis of Creative Commons Licensing, 46 IDEA 391 (2006).
163. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304 (2012).
164. See id. § 203(a)(5) (“Termination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding any
agreement to the contrary, including an agreement to make a will or to make any future
grant.”); Benjamin Melniker & Harvey D. Melniker, Termination of Transfers and Licenses
Under the New Copyright Law, 22 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 589 (1977) (summarizing the relevant
history of the termination right).
165. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1).
166. Id. § 106A(a)(3).
167. See id. § 106A(a) (extending moral rights only to visual arts).
168. See Dane S. Ciolino, Moral Rights and Real Obligations: A Property-Law Framework
for the Protection of Authors’ Moral Rights, 69 Tul. L. Rev. 935, 952–55 (1995) (describing
various state moral-rights laws).
169. See Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 Harv. Int’l L.J. 353, 359–67
(2006) (summarizing the more expansive moral-rights regimes of Europe).
170. The rights are personal in that they inhere in the author, not the work. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 106A(e)(2) (“Ownership of the [moral] rights conferred . . . with respect to a work of visual
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cannot transfer their moral rights, and transferees of the copyright rights
can never acquire the right to disregard a legally protected right of attribu-
tion or integrity.171
More broadly, the market’s ability to modulate intellectual property
protection critically depends on the level of transaction costs in that market.
When transaction costs are sufficiently low, we should expect to see a lot of
variety in the scope and content of rights. In the extreme, in a world without
transaction costs, the initial legal specification of intellectual property rights
would be of no consequence. In such a world, it would not be necessary for
lawmakers to specify legal rights; this task would better be left for the
market.172
In reality, though, the transaction costs that attend intellectual property
rights are quite significant. As numerous scholars have pointed out, the do-
main of intellectual property rights exhibits high information costs, signifi-
cant negotiation costs, and nontrivial enforcement costs.173 The market for
intellectual property is often characterized by overlapping claims, which cre-
ate opportunities for holdups and strategic bargaining.174 Hence, the market
will not produce ideally configured intellectual property rights.
In the real world, where transaction costs are a factor, legal defaults
matter. A growing body of research shows that the initial specification of the
default entitlements affects the willingness of their holders to transact over
them.175 Default rights, it turns out, are “sticky.” Once endowed with a legal
art is distinct from ownership of any copy of that work, or of a copyright or any exclusive right
under a copyright in that work.”). The rights are explicitly inalienable by statute as well. Id.
§ 106A(e)(1).
171. Id. § 106A(e)(1)–(2).
172. This is a feature of Professor Coase’s famous observation that the allocation of legal
entitlements loses consequence in a world of zero transaction costs. R.H. Coase, The Problem
of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960).
173. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 83, at 16 (finding that “[t]ransaction costs
tend to be high in the case of intellectual property even when there are only a few transactors,
actual or potential, in the picture”); Jonathan M. Barnett, Property as Process: How Innovation
Markets Select Innovation Regimes, 119 Yale L.J. 384, 407 (2009) (noting that “allocating enti-
tlements over upstream innovations can generate transaction costs that in turn impede down-
stream innovations”); Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis:
Balancing Intellectual Property Rights at the Boundary of the Firm, 2007 U. Ill. L. Rev. 575, 613
(observing that, “[g]iven that intellectual property rights have effects on transaction costs both
within firms and between firms, it follows that any provision of property rights will have
simultaneous effects within firms as well as between firms”); Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging
Information Without Intellectual Property, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 227, 277 (2012) (challenging the
conventional view that the dynamic benefits from intellectual property protection outweigh
the static costs and pointing out that allocating entitlements over upstream innovations can
generate transaction costs that in turn impede downstream innovations).
174. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94
Colum. L. Rev. 2655, 2659–60 (1994) (noting the difficulty of valuation caused by overlap-
ping rights, which erodes the possibility of Coasean bargaining).
175. See, e.g., Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. Econ.
Behav. & Org. 39, 44 (1980) (coining the term “endowment effect” to describe this princi-
ple); Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1227
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entitlement, right holders ascribe sufficient importance to the initial legal
specification of their entitlement that they are reluctant to deviate from it
even in the presence of low transaction costs.176 Hence, if the law provides
intellectual property holders with an expansive list of rights, they will tend
to retain the rights they have already received rather than give up those
rights voluntarily. If, however, the law were to provide owners with only a
modest list of entitlements, the owners would tend to refrain from accruing
more rights contractually.
The result is that, even if extant law permitted enough tailoring of
rights—and it does not—it would still distort owners’ and users’ choices by
setting default-rights levels too high. Our self-tailored approach reduces the
magnitude of this distortion.
C. Tailoring Rights by Industry
In an influential article, Burk and Lemley sought to reform patent law
by having judges modify numerous small patent doctrines to make them
sensitive to the needs of particular industries or technologies.177 Their pro-
posal draws on the empirical observation that patent protection already has
differential effects on different industries.178 For example, the pharmaceuti-
cal industry is heavily dependent on patent protection. Patents are a primary
driver of innovation in the industry, and pharmaceutical companies take full
advantage of the protection afforded to them by the law.179 By contrast,
firms in other technological sectors do not place the same significance on
patent protection, and the average firm in most other industries does not
need patent law’s full range of rights and powers.180 Burk and Lemley argue
that differences in the utilization and importance of patent rights mean that,
notwithstanding its uniform legal design, patent law is already varied in
practice.181 They claim that courts apply the doctrines of patent law differ-
ently based on the technological categories to which the patents belong.182
(2003); Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J. Legal Stud. 217
(1993).
176. Korobkin, supra note 175, at 1251–52.
177. Burk & Lemley, Technology-Specific, supra note 10; see also Dan L. Burk & Mark A.
Lemley, Biotechnology’s Uncertainty Principle, 54 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 691, 722 (2004) (ex-
plaining that “different industries experience both innovation and the patent system in very
different ways”).
178. Burk & Lemley, Technology-Specific, supra note 10, at 1156, 1158–85.
179. See Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and
Development, 1987 Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity 783, 818, 824; C.T. Taylor & Z.A.
Silberston, The Economic Impact of the Patent System: A Study of the British Expe-
rience (1973).
180. See Levin et al., supra note 179, at 817–18.
181. Burk & Lemley, Technology-Specific, supra note 10, at 1156 (noting that, “[a]s a prac-
tical matter, it appears that while patent law is technology-neutral in theory, it is technology-
specific in application”). For a similar claim about copyright law, see generally Joseph P. Liu,
Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. Rev. 87, 105–06 (2004).
182. Burk & Lemley, Technology-Specific, supra note 10, at 1182–85.
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Burk and Lemley propose that patent protection adopt de jure what has
already become the de facto practice. Courts should consciously reinterpret
various patent-law doctrines to apply in different ways to different industrial
settings, with different industries being subjected to different patent doc-
trines.183 Specifically, Burk and Lemley discuss five different industries—
chemistry, pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, semiconductors, and software—
and suggest how judges can utilize policy levers to tailor the protection
based on the specific characteristics of each of the industries.184
We share Burk and Lemley’s belief that it would be socially advanta-
geous to abandon the one-size-fits-all design of patent protection. But we
part ways as to the best method of achieving this goal.
We believe that our self-tailored model is superior to theirs for several
reasons. First, even if innovation in every industry shares certain important
characteristics, there is also a lot of variance within industrial sectors and
among inventions and inventors. This means that any standard protection
package would invariably miss on the margin. Some inventors would find
the standard bundle insufficient and would be disincentivized from in-
venting. For other inventors, the standard bundle would be too generous,
leading to more monopoly protection than is necessary to incentivize crea-
tion. Tailoring intellectual property protection by industry would reduce but
not eliminate these losses. Our proposal, by contrast, allows for individual
tailoring by giving every inventor, author, or business owner the power to
decide the optimal protection for her creation.
Second, Burk and Lemley’s proposal, if implemented, would impose a
heavy information burden on judges. Courts would not only have to strug-
gle to classify the industry to which an invention belongs (and consequently,
the right doctrine to apply); they would also have to follow industry practice
and develop doctrine in accordance with commercial practices and develop-
ments within the industry. The burdens would be especially acute in the
copyright context, as the world of art may be divided into a very large num-
ber of communities or groups of creative authorship. Add to this the high
cost of the classification process itself, as well as the risk of rigging—the
well-known problem that actors would try to move between categories based
on their specific needs—and we would end up with a very costly and bur-
densome system.
Our proposal, by comparison, avoids most of these costs. It is based on
a mechanism of ex ante self-screening, eliminating the possibility of strategic
recharacterizations of the nature of the invention and greatly reducing the
advantages of litigating for potential protection. Moreover, because our sys-
tem permits each right holder to tailor her individual protection, it does not
run the risk of under- or overprotecting inventors and creators.
183. Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 10, at 1638–41.
184. See Burk & Lemley, Patent Crisis, supra note 10, at 109–41; Burk & Lemley, Tech-
nology-Specific, supra note 10, at 1158–85.
276 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 113:231
D. Owners’ Inability to Value Their Rights
A final argument that may be raised against our proposal focuses on the
limited cognition of the agents that produce intellectual property. According
to this argument, inventors, authors, and maybe even businesses cannot be
trusted to assess ex ante with any degree of accuracy the value of their intan-
gible assets. Inventors, creators, and businesses are likely, so the argument
goes, grossly to over- and underestimate the value the market will ultimately
place on their creations. Hence, they would likely buy too little or too much
protection.185
It is true that creators’ ability to predict the future success of their work
is important. According to the incentive theory that underlies our concep-
tion of the intellectual property system, potential creators will invest in pro-
ducing intellectual property only if they expect to earn more from the
creation than they will invest in producing it. Uncertainty about future prof-
its surely impacts creators’ decisions. Because uncertain profits are less valu-
able than certain profits, creators will want greater property protection for
their intellectual rights of uncertain value than they would demand for
rights with a clearer stream of future income. Additionally, would-be cre-
ators might erroneously undervalue a potential intellectual property right
and decide to forgo investing in creation altogether. But our proposal does
not affect these problems in the least. It does not increase or decrease cre-
ators’ certainty regarding the value of their creations. Under both the cur-
rent system and our alternative proposal, creators make their investment
decisions before they know the ultimate value of their work. Whatever the
limitations on their knowledge, creators will decide ex ante whether to create
and what price to put on their creation. About as much as current law, our
proposal assures creators that they can acquire a set of rights that will justify
their work.
Ultimately, our proposal is interested in preserving the incentives to
produce intangible assets while reducing the cost to society. These incentives
are based on ex ante estimations of value rather than after-the-fact knowl-
edge. Accordingly, an after-the-fact discovery that a creator has bought too
much or too little protection is of no consequence to us, so long as she
expected enough value to induce her to create. Our proposal preserves the
incentive to create, and that is enough.
Indeed, studies on inventors’ expectations show that they tend to suffer
from excessive optimism about the value of their work. The so-called lottery
effect leads innovators to overestimate the likelihood that their work will
find success in the market.186 At the same time, other predictable behavioral
185. See, e.g., Yariv Brauner, Value in the Eye of the Beholder: The Valuation of Intangibles
for Transfer Pricing Purposes, 28 Va. Tax Rev. 79, 87–89 (2008) (explaining why it is so diffi-
cult to value intangible assets, specifically intellectual property).
186. See F.M. Scherer, The Innovation Lottery, in Expanding the Boundaries of Intel-
lectual Property: Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society 3–21 (Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001); Dennis D. Crouch, The Patent Lottery: Exploiting Behavioral
Economics for the Common Good, 16 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 141, 141–42 (2008).
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anomalies lead creators to overvalue their creation’s worth.187 These findings
mean that creators’ expected mistakes in evaluating their work’s value actu-
ally incentivize more creation, not less. To the degree that creators fail to
understand the probable rewards for their innovations, they are not likely to
lack incentives.
We openly admit that our proposal does marginally affect incentives. If
our proposal were adopted, creators of intellectual assets would need to pay
more to receive the same protection they get free of charge under today’s
regime. This means both that the investment in any given creation would be
larger and that the maximum potential return would be smaller. But these
effects would be felt only at the margins: that is, where the value of a crea-
tion were expected to be extremely small or where the investment in the
creation were expected to be enormous. At these extremes, our proposal
might diminish the total number of intellectual assets. It must be borne in
mind, however, that this change is not necessarily welfare diminishing. To
see why, it is necessary to return to our starting point. As we noted, every
increment in additional intellectual property protection brings decreasing
marginal returns in incentives to create, while marginal losses to society re-
main significant.188 Thus, the marginal loss in creativity resulting from our
proposal’s minor effect on incentives is likely to be quite small in relation to
the savings to society from eliminating excess protection.
Conclusion
In this Article, we developed a self-tailored system of intellectual prop-
erty rights that would allow inventors and creators to select the optimal pro-
tection for their intellectual works. Our design operates from the bottom up,
giving each inventor or creator a basic package of rights and enforcement
powers and then allowing her to add more rights and legal remedies in ex-
change for a fee. Importantly, our proposal lowers the social cost of produc-
tion and protection of intellectual goods. At the same time, it maintains an
adequate level of economic incentives to create and invent. Implementing
our proposal would accordingly constitute a marked improvement over the
extant one-size-fits-all design of intellectual property rights—a design that
burdens society with costly litigation and excessive monopolization.
In an era in which technology is a key determinant of economic growth
and information is an important driver of progress, our proposal promises
wider dissemination and more extensive use of inventions and expressive
works. Unlike other proposals for reform that seek to improve access to ex-
pressive works through compulsory licenses and other coercive policies, our
187. See, e.g., Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Creativity Effect,
78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 31 (2011); Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, Valuing Intel-
lectual Property: An Experiment, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (2010).
188. See Landes & Posner, supra note 83, at 20–21 (discussing the trade-off involved in
intellectual property protection).
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model is purely voluntary. It respects authors’ and inventors’ autonomy and
uses market mechanisms—specifically, pricing—to recalibrate our intellec-
tual property system in a way that incentivizes and rewards creativity.
